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Abstract 
  This thesis investigates the open economy policy rule under the assumption of 
asymmetries in monetary policy preference, and how such asymmetric monetary 
policy preference can contribute to the exchange rate forecasting literature. 
 
  The first chapter estimates an open economy monetary policy rule for the Bank of 
England and assesses its policy preference in the era of inflation targeting. The 
reduced-form estimates of the central bank policy function suggest that the 
preferences for the Bank of England can be characterised as asymmetries during the 
inflation targeting period, with the interest rate responses to the downside of the 
economy being larger than the response to the upside of the economy of the same 
magnitude. However, these results are not robust when we include the unconventional 
monetary policy period.  
 
The second chapter extends the standard Taylor rule fundamentals of the 
exchange rate by incorporating the asymmetric monetary preferences. We present an 
exchange rate forecasting model (augmented Taylor rule fundamentals) under a 
credible inflation-targeting regime, in which the exchange rate could have 
asymmetric responses to the level of inflation and output gap. Our empirical results 
indicate the importance of asymmetric exchange rate response for modelling the 
exchange rate movement. In particular, the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals can 
provide more robust short-term exchange rate predictability than the standard Taylor 
rule fundamental during the conventional monetary policy period. 
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General Introduction 
  It is well known that the combination of a quadratic loss function and a linear 
economic structure leads to a linear interest rate reaction function or Taylor rule, in 
which the policy instrument interest rate is a linear function of the inflation and output 
gap deviations from their respective targets. Although the empirical evidence illustrates 
that Taylor rule is able to capture the dynamic of short-term interest rate in the past two 
decades, researchers have challenged this conventional setup. In particular, they have 
argued that the loss function for the central bank is not quadratic, and therefore the 
Taylor rule derived from such function may not have a simple linear form.  
 
  This argument is based on two grounds. First, on the policy side, Blinder (1997, p. 6), 
the ex-vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve, argued that “academic macroeconomists 
tend to use quadratic loss functions for reason of mathematical convenience, 
thinking much about their substantive implications. The assumption is not 
innocuous...I believe that both practical central bankers and academics would benefit 
from more serious thinking about the functional form of the loss function”. In 
addition, Blinder (1998, pp. 19-20) also stated that “Central banks will take far more 
political heat when it tightens pre-emptively to avoid higher inflation than when it 
eases pre-emptively to avoid higher unemployment”. This statement suggests that the 
Fed may have asymmetric monetary preference under political pressure.  Furthermore, 
there are numerous studies show that empirical evidence is generally in favour of the 
existence of asymmetric monetary preferences. The quadratic specification and the 
subsequent linear interest reaction only implies that the central bank assigns equal 
weight to the positive and negative deviation of inflation and output from the target 
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values, and it cannot capture asymmetric monetary policy responses. Based on the 
evidence of asymmetry, the Taylor rule or interest rate reaction function is not 
necessarily linear, but instead is best described by a nonlinear form. 
 
Past literature who investigates the nonlinear interest rate reaction function mainly 
focused on a closed economy. In order to address this issue, this thesis investigates the 
asymmetric monetary policy preferences in an open economy context. For the first 
chapter, the research question is whether UK monetary policymakers have asymmetric 
policy intervention within an open economy framework. Our theoretical framework 
follows the Arghyrou and Pourpourides (2016) model, they show an optimal open 
economy monetary policy rule in which asymmetric monetary policy preferences not 
only cause the asymmetric policy responses but also lead to asymmetric exchange rate 
response under credible inflation targeting regime. We estimate such policy rule by 
using the GMM technique for the UK quarterly data in the era of inflation targeting. 
The empirical findings can be summarised as follows. First, we find that the Bank of 
England (BoE) weights the downside of the economy more than the upside during the 
inflation targeting period. That is to say, the Bank of England respond more 
aggressively when output and inflation fall below their target value. This is the first 
empirical evidence shows that the BoE has negative output gap asymmetry as the 
previous empirical literature who focused on closed economy model suggest that the 
Bank of England respond more aggressively when output and inflation exceed their 
target value. Therefore, it is important to consider the open economy factors when 
conducting the monetary policy analysis, especially for a small open economy like the 
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UK1. To the best of my knowledge, Caglayan et al. 2016 is the only study that examines 
the asymmetric monetary preference under the open economy, and their empirical 
analysis is   based on the UK and Canada data. However, their theoretical framework 
is not sufficient to capture the open economy effects for the UK. Due to its theoretical 
limitation, we investigate the asymmetric monetary preferences based on a new 
theoretical model, which is more consistent with the UK monetary policy practices. We 
will discuss more details in the section 1.2.1 
 
   In addition, existing studies have found strong evidence of exchange rate 
predictability with Taylor rule fundamentals. Taylor rule fundamentals of exchange rate 
based on a linear Taylor rule for monetary policy. If we assume that two economies 
both set interest rates according to the linear Taylor rule and the bilateral exchange rate 
will reflect their relative interest rate, then their bilateral exchange rate can be 
determined as a linear function of their output gap and their inflation level. In the second 
chapter, we challenge this set up from the following perspectives. First, the existing 
empirical literature has shown that countries under credible inflation targeting monetary 
policy experience asymmetric exchange rate response under inflation surprises. In 
particular, the depreciations following negative inflation surprises (actual inflation is 
lower than its expected value) are larger than the appreciation following positive 
inflation surprises (actual inflation is greater than its expected value). Second, as we 
mentioned before, the empirical evidence suggests that Taylor rule are not necessarily 
linear, and therefore a linear Taylor rule based exchange rate model may not adequate 
to capture the complexities of the exchange rate movement. We suspect that the 
                                                 
1 The character of smalls refers to the fact that, the UK is price taker as its policy cannot alter the key 
macroeconomic variables like the interest rate or the world price. In macroeconomic literature, there is a 
consensus that the UK is a small open economy. 
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asymmetry in exchange rate response is due to the asymmetry in the central bank’s 
preference. We first derive an augmented Taylor rule fundamentals from a nonlinear 
interest rate reaction function, in which the exchange rates are allowed to have 
asymmetric responses. Hence, the research question for the second chapter is whether 
the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals can provide stronger evidence of short-term 
exchange rate predictability than the Taylor rule fundamentals for countries with 
credible inflation targeting monetary policy. Our empirical results suggest that the 
augmented Taylor rule fundamentals can outperform the Taylor rule fundamentals 
during the conventional monetary policy period (the inflation targeting period but prior 
to the recent financial crisis).  
  However, once we include the unconventional monetary policy period and the pre-
inflation targeting period, the evidence of exchange rate predictability for augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals is much weak. The reasons for such weak exchange rate 
predictability can be summarised as follows. Firstly, the augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals assume that the central bank use interest rate as its main policy instrument, 
however, the major central banks have changed its policy instruments from interest rate 
to other variables during the unconventional monetary policy period. Therefore, the 
augmented Taylor rule is not sufficient to capture the policy shift for the unconventional 
monetary policy period. Secondly, based on the theoretical framework and past 
empirical evidence, the asymmetric exchange rate behaviour mainly applies to a 
country that operates credible inflation targeting regime. However, the monetary policy 
cannot be regarded as credible inflation targeting regime before the inflation targeting 
period. Hence, due to the inconsistencies between the model assumption and the 
monetary policy regime, it should be no surprise for the relatively weaker exchange rate 
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predictability for the unconventional monetary policy period and the pre-inflation 
targeting period. 
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Chapter 1  
Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences in Small Open 
Economies with Inflation-targeting Regimes: Evidence from 
the UK 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Background  
It is commonly known that the monetary policy plays an essential role in the 
operation of the economy. Past literature has reached a consensus for evaluating the 
monetary policy in the early 2000s. In particular, they assumed that the central bank 
minimises a quadratic loss function subject to a linear structure of the economy, and 
use such framework to derive an optimal policy rule for the monetary authority. This 
type of policy rule shows that the short-term interest rate is a linear function of inflation 
and output in which the monetary authority assigns equal weight to the positive and 
negative deviation of inflation and output from the target levels. 
 
However, some researchers have demonstrated that the use of quadratic loss 
function and the linear interest rate reaction are questionable. On the theoretical side, 
Gali et al. (2002) argue that the cost of output fluctuations are asymmetric for the US, 
and therefore policymakers may assign different weights between positive and negative 
deviations from the output and inflation targets. In addition, Persson and Tabellini 
(1999) and Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) show that the career concerned 
policymakers may have larger aversion to output contraction than to output expansion 
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as they are more likely to be reappointed with such asymmetric objective. On the 
empirical side, a number of papers have derived and estimated a nonlinear policy rule 
under the assumption that policymakers have asymmetric preference. Generally 
speaking, the empirical evidence supports the notion of the nonlinear policy rule and 
the existence of asymmetric objective for the monetary authority (see Dolado et al. 
2005, Surico 2007a, 2007b). However, the existing literature mainly examines the 
assumption of asymmetric preferences within a closed economy, only a few studies 
have explored such assumption under an open economy framework. 
 
1.1.2 Motivation 
In this study, we investigate the assumption of asymmetric monetary preference for 
the BoE within an open economy new-Keynesian framework. In doing so, we follow 
the theoretical framework derived by Arghyrou and Pourpourides (2016), (hereafter, 
A&P). In contrast with the existing literature, the optimal policy rule provided by A&P 
taking into account the effects of asymmetric monetary policy preference on exchange 
rate behaviour, in which the asymmetric monetary preferences will not only lead to 
asymmetric interest rate responses, but more importantly, also cause asymmetric 
exchange rate responses. We argue that A&P’s theoretical framework is suitable for the 
UK data for the following reasons. Firstly, the important presumption of A&P’s model 
is the asymmetric interest rate responses and the potential asymmetric exchange rate 
response only occurs if the central bank operates a credible inflation targeting monetary 
policy, which is in line with the BoE policy framework as the BoE has adopted a formal 
inflation targeting regime in October of 1992 and achieved credibility in anchoring 
inflation expectation after the adoption of the inflation targeting regime. Secondly, the 
past empirical literature has illustrated that the asymmetric exchange rate responses are 
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significant for the British Pound during the inflation targeting period (Clarida and 
Waldman, 2008). As a result, an open economy policy rule that embodies the potential 
asymmetric exchange rate responses is crucial for investigating the BoE’s monetary 
preference during the inflation targeting era. 
 
1.1.3 Main Findings 
We estimate the open economy monetary policy rule by using the generalised 
method of moments (GMM) for the UK during the inflation targeting period, 1992Q4-
2015Q4. In order to deal with the policy shift during the financial crisis, we split the 
sample into two types of sub-sample periods, before and after the unconventional 
monetary period. The main empirical findings for this chapter can be summarised as 
follows: for the case of the UK, the researchers mainly found that the BoE react more 
aggressively when the inflation is greater than its target value but not the opposite after 
the introduction of the inflation targeting regime. This seems plausible during periods 
of inflation stabilisation where the BoE is trying to build up credibility and anchor the 
inflation expectation. However, by considering the effects of asymmetric monetary 
policy preference on exchange rate behaviour, our empirical results suggest that the 
BoE are more averse to negative than to positive output gaps of the equal size during 
the inflation targeting period but prior to the financial crisis, and has larger aversion to 
negative inflation gap than to positive inflation gap before to the introduction of QE, 
which to my best knowledge is the first in the literature for investigating the BoE’s 
monetary policy preferences.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 discusses the past literature 
of the asymmetric monetary preferences. Section 1.3 presents the detail theoretical 
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framework of A&P’s model. Section 1.4 shows the data, estimation strategy and the 
empirical results. Section 1.5 provides the robustness checks for the empirical findings, 
and the conclusion is represented in section 1.6. 
 
1.2 Literature review 
A nonlinear policy rule can be regarded as the most common way to identify the 
asymmetric monetary preference. The nonlinear policy function arises because the loss 
function for policymakers is not quadratic, or the structure of the economy is not linear. 
By challenging the quadratic loss function or the linear economic structure, past 
literature has provided international evidence that supports the notion of nonlinear 
policy function. Examples include Nobay and Peel (2003), Ruge-Murica (2003), 
Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008), among others. Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) adopt 
a nonlinear inflation reaction function and demonstrate that the hypothesis of 
asymmetric objective holds for some OECD economies. Dolado et al. (2004) derive a 
monetary policy rule based on two types of non-linearity. Firstly, the central bank’s 
preferences are asymmetric. Secondly, the aggregate supply relation is non-linear. By 
estimating the monetary policy rule, they find that the US monetary policy can be 
characterised as non-linear after 1983 but not before 1979. In addition, there is no 
evidence in favour of the non-linear aggregate supply relation.  
Another approach to assessing the nonlinear policy rule is using threshold 
regression, in which the policy reaction function follows different regimes characterised 
by an inflation or output threshold. Therefore, the central bank may have different 
monetary preference depending on the state of the economy. Taylor and Davradkis 
(2006) is the first study to use this approach to investigate the non-linear Taylor rule, 
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followed by Komlan (2013), Sznajdersk (2014), among others. The evidence found by 
these studies confirm non-linear interest rate setting behaviour for the UK, Canada, the 
ECB and some emerging economies.  
 
One of the popular theoretical models to explaining the central bank’s asymmetric 
preference is provided by Surico (2007a). He adopts a linear exponential (Linex) loss 
function but maintains a linear economic structure, and derive an optimal policy rule in 
which the monetary authority is allowed to assign different weights to positive and 
negative deviations of inflation and output from the target values. He estimates the 
reduced form of the policy rule for the Fed, and found that the monetary policy 
preference for the Fed has been asymmetric with respect to both inflation and output 
gaps. Similar evidence is found for the European Central Bank (ECB), in which output 
contractions trigger larger policy responses than output expansions of the same size 
(Surico, 2007b). In addition, he extends his model by introducing the monetary 
aggregate into the policy function, however, the empirical evidence suggests the 
stabilisation of the money growth rate is not an independent goal of the ECB monetary 
policy.   
 
1.2.1   The past empirical evidence for the BoE 
As the asymmetry arises because the actual inflation deviates from its target value, 
such framework may more suitable for a country with formal inflation targeting regime. 
In particular, the UK has received some attention with previous research. Srinvasan et 
al. (2006) further developed Surico’s framework with two main modifications. Firstly, 
they introduced a zone-quadratic preference specification for the UK economy. They 
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argue that the BoE controls inflation within a target range rather than aiming for a target 
point. The advantage of specifying a range that it can provide flexibility to the 
policymakers and signal the public that control of inflation is imperfect. Secondly, they 
use the ex-post monthly forecast of inflation to estimate the policy reaction function. 
The coefficient on both squared output gap and the squared inflation gap are positive 
and significant. That is, there is a deflationary bias for the UK, which is consistent with 
the previous empirical evidence for the UK (Mishkin and Posen, 1997, Ruge-Murica, 
2004). In addition, the BoE was attempting to keep inflation forecast within a range 
only for the period between 1992 and 1995. 
 
Likewise, Boinet and Martin (2008) also test the assumption that the BoE targets 
the range of inflation rate rather a specific rate. In particular, they derive an optimal 
monetary policy rule that allows for both zone-like and asymmetric behaviour. They 
classified four cases for comparison: liner, asymmetric, zone symmetric and zone 
asymmetric. The evidence in favour of a zone-like response to inflation, with a linear 
interest response to the output gap. However, there is no evidence in favour of 
asymmetric policy responses. In addition, Taylor and Davradakis (2006) firstly propose 
a threshold model to examine potential nonlinearity in the Taylor rule for the BoE 
during the inflation targeting period. The interest rate setting behaviour can be well 
captured by a Taylor rule if the expected inflation is significantly greater than its target 
rate. On the other hand, the interest rate becomes unrelated to the expected inflation 
rate if it less than the target rate. Therefore, the difference in the interest adjustment 
leads to asymmetry for interest rate setting.  
 21 
 
   Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008) use smooth transition regressions to test the 
nonlinear Taylor rule for UK data over two sub-sample periods, 1979Q3-1990Q3 and 
1992Q4-2005Q4. The two sub-periods arise because the BoE has adopted the inflation 
targeting regime in October of 1992. Compared with the studies I have mentioned above, 
the also include the pre-inflation targeting period. The empirical results suggest that the 
BoE has weighted more on recession before the inflation targeting period, however, 
during the inflation targeting period,  such preference has been switched in which the 
BoE has larger policy response to positive inflation gap. 
 
It should be noted that past literature mainly focuses on the closed economy model. 
To the best of my knowledge, Caglayan et al. (2016) is the only study that investigates 
an optimal open economy policy function with the assumption of asymmetric 
preference. They derive and examine the optimal open economy policy rule for both 
BoE and the Bank of Canada (BoC), and the reported results suggest that the BoE has 
positive inflation and positive output gap asymmetries under an open economy 
environment. In addition, the real exchange rate enters the monetary policy rule as the 
real exchange rate has strong negative impacts on the interest rate. According to their 
model assumption, the depreciation of the real exchange rate will result into a reduction 
in domestic output, putting a downward pressure on the domestic interest rate, and 
therefore the negative impact of real exchange rate on interest rate is consistent with 
their theoretical framework.   
 
It is clear that Caglayan et al. (2016) has investigated the open economy policy rule 
under the assumption of asymmetric monetary policy preference. However, we argue 
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that our theoretical framework and the empirical analysis are more consistent with the 
dynamics of the UK economy. The main differences can be summarised as follows. 
Firstly, although we introduce the exchange rate term in the policy rule, we do not 
explicitly show that the exchange rate has a direct impact on the interest rate. In contrast, 
we explicitly show that the asymmetric response of interest rate to the deviation of the 
output gap and inflation gap, and such asymmetric responses will potentially lead to the 
asymmetric exchange rate responses through the uncovered interest rate parity (UIRP) 
condition. 
Secondly, they include the pre-inflation targeting period for the estimation (back to 
1983Q1), and without any concerns of the policy shift. If the estimation covers the 
period before the inflation targeting regime, the empirical evidence should distinguish 
the structure change of the monetary policy around 1992Q4 when the BoE monetary 
policy shifted to a framework of inflation targeting. Furthermore, it is clear that the UK 
experienced relatively higher inflation between 1983Q1 and 1992Q4, the average 
inflation in this period was two times higher than the post-inflation targeting period.2 If 
the BoE considers the inflation stabilisation as its objective, then such higher inflation 
is not plausible. Therefore, the potential structure change of the monetary policy around 
1992Q4 should be considered. 
Finally, they propose an open economy Phillips curve by including changes in the 
real exchange rate, which is inconsistent with the UK data. There is empirical evidence 
suggests that a tight relationship between real exchange rate and inflation is not 
supported by the UK data. Kara and Nelson (2003) estimate open economy Phillips 
curve for the UK, the coefficient on the change of real exchange rate is wrongly signed 
                                                 
2 The average CPI inflation for UK is 4.9% between 1983Q1 and 1992Q3 and down to average 2% 
after the 1992Q4. 
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regardless of the estimation period. They conclude that “the elasticity of inflation with 
respect to exchange rate depreciation does not take its expected positive value”.  
While, our theoretical framework excludes the exchange rate effects on inflation in the 
aggregate supply relation, and therefore is more consistent with the UK data, at least 
empirically. 
1.3   Model Settings 
Despite the fact that Surico’s model has been widely cited, the subsequent literature 
mainly evaluates the optimal policy rule in the context of a closed economy framework. 
This is due to the fact that many researchers argued that the exchange rate or other 
foreign factors are implicitly incorporated in domestic variables such as prices, and 
therefore their effect can be excluded for the monetary policy analysis (see Taylor 2001, 
McCallum and Nelson, 2000). However, A&P has further modified Surico model and 
make it possible to explore the central bank policy rule in an open economy 
environment. In this section, we outline the theoretical model as described in A&P. 
 
1.3.1   The motivation for A&P (2016) 
A&P’s model was motivated by two stylized facts from the past empirical studies. 
First, under a credible inflation targeting regime, the exchange rate effects of inflation 
announcements go against the traditional Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) hypothesis. 
The unexpected positive inflation surprises (the actual inflation rate higher than its 
expected value) would lead to an appreciation of the domestic currency. On the other 
hand, when the positive inflation surprise (the actual inflation rate is lower than its 
expected value) occurs, the domestic exchange rate is often to depreciate. The second 
stylized fact is that the relationship described above is not linear but subject to sign 
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effects. In detail, the depreciation following a negative inflation surprise is large in 
absolute size and stronger statistical significance than the appreciation following 
positive inflation surprise. It also should be noted that both stylized facts are stronger 
statistical significance for inflation targeting country than non-inflation targeting 
country (Clarida and Waldman, 2008). 
 
Based on these two stylized facts and given the fact that such evidence is more 
significant for inflation targeting countries. A&P argue that the asymmetric exchange 
rate responses to inflation rate are due to the central bank’s asymmetry monetary policy 
preferences. In detail, if central banks have larger aversion to inflation rate under its 
target level (and/or actual output gap under its potential level) than to inflation rate 
greater than its target level (and/or actual output gap beyond its potential level). Then, 
under credible inflation targeting regime, they will reduce the interest rate more 
aggressively when nominal interest rate must be reduced to meet the inflation target 
than to increase the interest rate when interest rates need to be increased to meet the 
same target. Consequently, changes in nominal interest rates result in changes in ex-
ante real interest rates, then cause stronger depreciation under negative inflation 
surprises rather and weaker appreciation under positive inflation surprises. Finally, they 
present an open economy model, which provide a theoretical explanation for 
asymmetries in exchange rate responses based on asymmetric monetary policy 
preferences. 
 
1.3.2   The policy preference and a non-linear policy rule  
The structure of the economy is represented by a purely forward-looking new 
Keynesian, sticky prices framework, presented in Clarida et al. (1999), where the output 
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gap and the inflation rate are respectively expressed in terms of an IS equation and a 
Phillips curve: 
𝑦𝑡 = −𝜙[𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ] + 𝜃𝑆𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡+1
𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡, 𝜙, 𝜃 > 0             (1.1) 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜆𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 + 𝜂𝑡 , 𝜆, 𝛽 > 0                                      (1.2)
3 
We denote the output gap by 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌?̅?, 𝑌𝑡 and 𝑌?̅? are the logs of real gross domestic 
product (GDP) and potential real GDP. 𝜋𝑡 is the inflation rate, and is defined as the 
percent change in the aggregate price level between periods 𝑡 − 1  and 𝑡 . 𝑆𝑡  is the 
nominal exchange rate, the increase of 𝑆𝑡  denotes a deprecation of the domestic 
currency. The coefficients  𝜙 ,  𝜃 , 𝜆  and 𝛽  are greater than zero. The superscript 𝑒 
represent the expectation of the variable while 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 are innovations to the output 
gap and the inflation rate. The equation (1.1) is a standard forward-looking optimising 
IS equation, which can be derived as a log-linear approximation to the Euler condition. 
However, for analytical purpose, it is an augmented version by adding the nominal 
exchange rate. It basically brings the notion of consumption smoothing into an 
aggregate demand formulation by making the output gap a positive function of its future 
value and the nominal exchange rate, and a negative function of the real rate of interest. 
On the other hand, equation (1.2) is the Phillips equation that can be derived from the 
Calvo (1983) model with the staggered price adjustment in which firms set prices as a 
constant mark-up over the marginal cost. It shows that each firm adjusts its price with 
a constant probability in any given period, and independently from the time elapsed 
from the last adjustment.  
 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that if β = 1, the system described by (1.1) and (1.2) has no stable solution. It can 
only jump to a new equilibrium. The system only gives a stable path if β is less than unity. 
 26 
 
It should be noted that the specifications of equation (1.1) and (1.2) demonstrate 
that the aggregate demand and supply relations are purely forward-looking and without 
any backwards-looking element. Past literature has identified that the forward-looking 
elements have been dominated for the UK economy while the backwards-looking 
elements are either insignificant or only account for a small proportion of inflation and 
output gap dynamics (see, Leith and Malley, 2007 and Batini et al. 2005). Hence, we 
suspect that the forward-looking specification is more consistent with the UK economy. 
In addition, A&P assumes UIRP holds for the economy. 
(1 + 𝑖𝑡) =
𝑠𝑡+1
𝑒
𝑠𝑡
(1 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑓)              (1.3) 
Where 𝑖𝑡
𝑓
 is the foreign interest rate. Following Surico (2007a), the monetary 
policymakers choose the nominal interest rate in each period to minimise the loss 
function,𝐿 
𝐿 =
𝑒𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗)−𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗)−1
𝛼2
+ 𝛿(
𝑒𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝛾𝑦𝑡−1
𝛾2
) +
𝜇
2
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖
∗)2      (1.4) 
Where 𝜋∗ and 𝑖∗ are the inflation target rate and the interest rate target. The parameters 
𝛿  and 𝜇  denotes the central bank’s aversion towards output fluctuations around 
potential and towards interest rate fluctuations around  𝑖∗ . The parameters 𝛼  and 𝛾 
capture any asymmetry in the objective function of the monetary policymakers. The 
negative value of 𝛾 implies that, everything else equals, monetary policymakers assign 
higher weights to output contraction than to an output expansion when setting the 
interest rate. A similar interpretation holds for 𝛼, the negative value of 𝛼 implies that 
low inflation relative to the target is more costly than high inflation. It should be also 
noted that the linex loss function nest the quadratic loss function when both 𝛼 and 𝛾 
tend to zero4.  
                                                 
4 This can be obtained by simplifying the exponential term as a second order Taylor approximation.   
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The monetary policymaker minimises 𝐿 in (1.4) subject to (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) and the 
first-order condition reads:5 
[𝜙 + 𝜃 (
𝑠𝑡
1+𝑖𝑡
)] 𝑍𝑡 = 𝜇(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖
∗)      (1.8) 
Where 𝑍𝑡 = 𝜆
𝑒𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗)−1
𝛼
+ 𝛿
𝑒𝛾𝑦𝑡−1
𝛾
. The first order condition depicts an optimal but 
potentially nonlinear response of the monetary authority to the development in the 
economy. The parameter α and γ are crucial for the evaluation of the monetary policy 
preference. When α  and γ  tend to zero, the assumption of asymmetric monetary 
preference will be collapsed, which suggest a linear policy rule with symmetric 
monetary prefence. Hence, testing whether the parameters α and γ are significantly 
different from zero are equivalent to testing the hypothesis of asymmetric monetary 
preferences. If both alpha and gamma are significantly different from zero, we can 
confirm the central bank has the asymmetric response of interest rate to the deviations 
of inflation rate the and output gap from their target value. In contrast, if both alpha and 
gamma have to be equal to zero, then it implies the symmetric central bank preference. 
1.4   Empirical Analysis 
1.4.1   Data 
This section shows the data descriptions, estimates, and the relevant test of the 
nonlinear policy reaction function. According to A&P’s framework, the asymmetric 
monetary preference should only achieve in a country with a credible inflation targeting 
regime in which the expectations of inflation are well anchored to the credible inflation 
target. Over the last 20 years or so, the BoE’s has been recognized as the most 
                                                 
 
5 See Appendix 1 for the detailed derivation of the first order condition 
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successful example for adopting the inflation targeting regime because of the significant 
reduction in the level and variability of the inflation (Haldane, 2000, Gürkaynak, 2010). 
Hence, we choose to examine the asymmetric monetary preference in the optimal non-
linear policy rule of the BoE. This analysis is based on the quarterly data of the UK 
during the inflation targeting period, between 1992Q4 and 2015Q4. An important 
concern with our sample period is it also includes the period of the financial crisis, Great 
Recession, and slow recovery for the UK economy. It is clear that the theoretical 
frameworks suggested by Surico and A&P postulate that the monetary policy reaction 
function takes the form of an optimal interest rate rule. This renders our analysis more 
suitable for the period of conventional monetary policy rather than the period of 
unconventional monetary policy, where the main monetary policy instrument is the 
changes in the level of money supply rather than changes in interest rate, due to the zero 
lower bound limit. Consequently, we infer that any policy shift for monetary policy 
may reduce the explanatory power of the model. For this reason, we use different sub-
periods to deal with the potential structural change of the monetary policy during the 
inflation targeting period. We will illustrate more details in the next part.  
 
For our empirical analysis, the policy interest rate is represented by the three-month 
Treasury bill, which is obtained from the website of the BoE. Inflation is measured as 
the annual change in the retail price index (RPI). In addition, we also report the policy 
reaction function estimates using the change in the consumer price index (CPI). Both 
inflation measures are obtained from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) website. 
The nominal exchange rate is represented by the nominal effective exchange rate from 
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BIS (Bank for International Settlements)6, the increase of the exchange rate means a 
depreciation of the GBP (Pound Sterling).  
 
Furthermore, we use the Hodrick-Prescott cyclical component (HP filter) of the 
logarithm of real GDP to constructing the output gap. However, it is known that filtered 
values at the end of the sample are very different from those in the middle, and also 
characterized by spurious dynamics (see Hamilton, 1994). As a result, we follow Baxter 
and King’s (1995) approach, by dropping observations at the beginning and at the end 
of the sample. In practice, we construct the output gap series based on the UK real GDP, 
1980Q1-2018Q1, and drop the observations before 1992Q4 and after 2015Q4. 
Therefore, our output gap series can avoid the end of sample problem of filter values. 
 
1.4.2   Estimation strategy  
Our main objective is to estimate the nonlinear policy reaction function to 
evaluating whether the monetary preference parameters 𝛼  and 𝛾  are significant 
differently from zero. In order to achieve this, we linearise the exponential term in the 
first order condition by using a second order Taylor series approximations (see Dijk et 
al, 2002, for a survey). Then, the first order condition is reparametrized as follows:7  
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖
∗ + 𝑑1
, [𝜙(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) + 𝜃
𝑠𝑡
(1+𝑖𝑡)
(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)] + 𝑑2
, [𝜙(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)2 +
𝜃
𝑠𝑡
(1+𝑖𝑡)
(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)2] +   𝑑3
, [𝜙𝑦𝑡 + 𝜃
𝑠𝑡
(1+𝑖𝑡)
𝑦𝑡] + 𝑑4
, [𝜙𝑦𝑡
2 + 𝜃
𝑠𝑡
(1+𝑖𝑡)
𝑦𝑡
2] + 𝑣𝑡 (2.0) 
                                                 
  6 The nominal effective exchange rate is based on the bilateral trade with the UK. Euro, Dollar and Yen 
assign the majority of the weights in calculating sterling nominal effective exchange rate indices. For 
details, see http://www.bis.org/statistics/eer.html. 
  7 See Appendix 2 for the Taylor series approximation of the first order condition. 
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Equation (2.0) is the policy reaction function for the BoE, where 𝑑1
, =
𝜆
𝜇
, 𝑑3
, =
𝛿
𝜇
 
𝑑2
, = 𝛼𝑑1
, /2  and 𝑑4
, = 𝛾𝑑3
, /2.  The parameters  𝑑1
,
 and 𝑑3
,
 are the convolutional 
parameters corresponding to the structure of the economy. Following the specification 
in the previous section, 𝑑1
,
 and 𝑑3
,
 should be greater than zero as 𝜆, 𝜇 and 𝛿 are all great 
than zero based on A&P’s framework. It is clear that the parameters (𝑑1
, , 𝑑2
, , 𝑑3
,  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑4
,
) 
from equation (2.0) can only be interpreted as convolutions of the coefficients 
corresponding to policy preference and the structure of the economy, and we are not 
able to recover all the structural parameters from equation (2.0) However, we can 
recover the asymmetric preference 𝛼 and 𝛾 as 𝛼 =  2𝑑2
, /𝑑1
, , 𝛾 =  2𝑑4
, /𝑑3
,
. In detail, 
the joint restriction of  𝑑2
, = 𝑑4
, = 0 with 𝑑1
, , 𝑑3
, ≠ 0 indicates 𝛼 = 𝛾 = 0. Therefore, 
we can test the null hypothesis 𝑑2
, = 𝑑4
, = 0 to identify the central bank’s asymmetric 
preferences since the above null hypothesis is equivalent to the original null 
hypothesis 𝛼 = 𝛾 = 0. We test such null hypothesis using the standard Wald test. If the 
null of symmetric preference can be rejected, then we conduct the policy function 
estimation to quantify the degree of nonlinearity.  
 
Our empirical analysis consists of two-stage estimations. In order to estimate the 
coefficients of 𝑑1
, , 𝑑2
, , 𝑑3
,  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑4
,
, the value of 𝜙 and 𝜃 are crucial. As there is no strong 
information for 𝜙 and 𝜃, we let the data speak about the value of 𝜙 and 𝜃 rather than 
assume them. We perform single IS equation estimation based on UK data to obtaining 
the value 𝜙 and 𝜃. By treating these two coefficients as constant in the policy reaction, 
we can replace 𝜙 and 𝜃 in the policy reaction function with the estimated values from 
IS estimation results. Finally, we are able to recover 𝛼 and 𝛾 by estimating the policy 
reaction function. 
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1.4.3  The open economy IS equation estimates  
The specific form of the IS equation is based on A&P’s model (equation 1.1), which 
is augmented with the nominal exchange rate. According to the previous literature, the 
general specification to capture the open economy effects is adding the real exchange 
rate (see, Svensson, 2000). However, in order to derive the first order condition as 
showed in A&P, the use of nominal exchange rate is crucial. As our theoretical 
framework is based on A&P’s model, we also use equation 1.1 for our IS equation 
estimation. 
 
There are several reasons for supporting this open economy specification. Due to 
the relative price stickiness in the short run, we can rewrite the real exchange rate by 
assuming 𝑝∗ = 𝑝, then we can get q ≈ 𝑠. Furthermore, the real exchange rate generally 
shares a high correlation with the nominal exchange rate. In addition, McCallum and 
Nelson’s (2000) demonstrate a depreciation of domestic currency tends to increase the 
output gap for two reasons (For both nominal term and real term). Firstly, higher output 
gap due to higher export demand from the deprecation. Secondly, a depreciation 
increase the costing of producing domestic goods and therefore decrease potential 
output. By adding these two effects together, it is clear that the nominal exchange rate 
should has a positive relationship with the output gap. 
 
Prior to the estimation, we assume that the structure of the economy follows the 
hypothesis of rational expectation. Under rational expectation, the expected term can 
be replaced by the realised value, and therefore 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 = 𝜋𝑡+1 and 𝑦𝑡+1
𝑒 = 𝑦𝑡+1 . In 
addition, we also introduce a dummy variable to control the extreme periods, and the 
IS equation can be further modified as follows: 
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𝑦𝑡 = −𝜙[𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡+1 ] − 𝜙
,[𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡+1 ] ∗ 𝑑 + 𝜃𝑆𝑡 + 𝜃
,𝑆𝑡 ∗ 𝑑 + 𝜔𝑦𝑡+1 + 𝜔
,𝑦𝑡+1 ∗
𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡 (2.1) 
Where   𝑑 is a dummy variable. We set 𝑑 equals to 1 for 1992Q4-1993Q4 and 2007Q4-
2008Q3, and 0 elsewhere. The setting of the dummy variable can capture an important 
aspect of the change of economic condition during the sample period. Although the UK 
has withdrawn the pound sterling from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
and introduced the inflation targeting after the ERM crisis (1991-1992). There was still 
remarkable uncertainty about the implication of the new monetary policy regime and 
the inflationary consequence of the sterling devaluation. During the period between 
1992Q4 and 1993Q4, there was a falling of interest rate, exchange rate, and associated 
with the negative output gap. Furthermore, the Global Financial Crisis started in July 
2007, and the first reduction of the UK interest rate take place in December 2007. And, 
the BoE has introduced the Quantitative Ease (QE) in October 2008. Consequently, we 
argue that the period for 1992Q4-1993Q4 and 2007Q4-2008Q3 are the exceptional 
phases for the UK economy as this period was associated with monetary policy change 
and potential uncertainty. 
 
We now report the estimates of the IS equation. Based on our setting of the dummy, 
we regard the period between 1994Q1 and 2007Q2 as a normal economic period. This 
sub-period is in the inflation targeting period, but after the ERM crisis and before the 
recent financial crisis, and therefore it excludes the extreme periods for our sample 
series. As we include the dummy variable to control the extreme periods, we can extend 
the normal economic period, which covers the period between 1992Q4 and 2008Q3 for 
the IS equation estimation. In addition, we also perform estimation for the period 
1992Q4-2007Q3 as this period is in the inflation targeting period but prior to the 
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financial crisis, which could be regarded as a potential normal economic period. 
Consequently, we report the IS estimation results for 1992Q4-2008Q3, 1992Q4-
2007Q3. However, we also include the IS estimation result for the period 1994Q1-
2007Q2 as this is the most representative period of conventional monetary policy within 
the data sample. Therefore, the estimates for 1992Q4-2008Q3 and 1992Q4-2007Q3 
must be consistent with the estimates for 1994Q1-2007Q2, otherwise we cannot clarify 
the use of the dummy for period 1992Q4-2007Q3 and 1992Q4-2008Q3. 
 
By controlling the extreme period for 1992Q4-2008Q3 and 1992Q4-2007Q3, the 
estimated coefficient for those three sub-periods should be consistent as all of them 
meet the requirement of the normal economic condition. It should be noted that the 
period between 1994Q1 and 2007Q2 excludes the extreme periods, and therefore we 
do not use the dummy variable for this period. Furthermore, it is known that the 
monetary policy can be regarded as unconventional after the introduction of QE in 
October 2008, and the economic condition turned out to be abnormal. However, for 
purpose of comparison, and with the potential instability check, we also perform the 
estimation for the full inflation targeting period. We estimate the open economy IS 
equation for the UK using GMM technique. Three lags of output gap, RPI inflation, 
interest rate and exchange rate are used as instruments. The alternative inflation 
measure CPI is also used as BoE has switched its inflation targeting measure from RPI 
to CPI in October 2003. In addition, in order to capture the open economy influences, 
we include foreign interest rate as instruments. 
 
Table 1.1 reports the results of IS equation estimation. As we can see from the table, 
the coefficient on the ex-ante interest rate and the nominal exchange rate for the UK are 
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highly significant across all four periods, and the signs are consistent with the model 
prediction ( 𝜙, 𝜃 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜔 > 0 ).  The estimated coefficients for 1992Q4-2008Q3, 
1992Q4-2007Q3 and 1994Q1-2007Q2 do not differ widely. In particular, the value of 
𝜙 are consistent for these periods. The full sample estimates are also close to the normal 
period, and therefore our open economy IS equation holds for the UK economy during 
the inflation targeting period. 
Table 1.1: GMM estimates of the open economy IS equation (nominal exchange rate)8 
 1992Q4-2007Q3 1992Q4-2008Q3 1992Q4-2015Q4 1994Q1-2007Q2 
𝜙 0.09*** 
(0.020) 
0.07*** 
(0.020) 
0.06*** 
(0.001) 
0.07*** 
(0.017) 
𝜃 0.10*** 
(0.026) 
0.07** 
(0.035) 
0.09*** 
(0.027) 
0.05*** 
(0.017) 
𝜔 0.83*** 
(0.018) 
0.76*** 
(0.030) 
0.81*** 
(0.028) 
0.79*** 
(0.015) 
Notes: Instruments are the constant and three lags of the following variables (starting from date 𝑡 −
1): output gap, CPI inflation, RPI inflation, interest rate, foreign Interest rate9, nominal exchange rate. 
The script *** and ** denote the rejection of null hypothesis of coefficient is zero at the 1% and 5% 
significance levels. Values in parentheses are strand errors using the Newey-West correction for the 
covariance matrix10. 
 
As we mentioned in the previous section, the past literature uses the real exchange 
rate to capture the open economy influences. Hence, we also perform the estimation by 
using the real exchange rate for the robustness check. According to the table 1.2, the 
estimation results are extremely close to the estimates for the nominal exchange rate, 
and therefore we argue that the empirical evidence supports our specification for using 
nominal exchange rate instead of the real exchange rate. In addition, for the full sample 
estimates, the results are not consistent with the previous case. Although the interest 
elasticity remains significant, the coefficient of exchange rate on output gap becomes 
insignificant. This situation may reflect the fact that our open economy IS equation may 
                                                 
8 For full sample estimates, the dummy 𝑑 equals to 1 for 1992Q4-1993Q4 and 2007Q4 onwards, and 
0 elsewhere. 
9 The foreign interest rate is the weighted average nominal interest rate of Euro area (0.62), US (0.23) 
and Japan (0.15). 
10  We use Newey–West correction of the variance–covariance matrix when estimate the open 
economy IS equation, and therefore the standard errors are reported by using Newey-west correction. 
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have the problem of instability if we extend the sample to the unconventional monetary 
policy period. 
Table 1.2: GMM estimates of the open economy IS equation (real exchange rate) 
 1992Q4-2007Q3 1992Q4-2008Q3 1992Q4-2015Q4 1994Q1-2007Q2 
𝜙 0.10*** 
(0.022) 
0.08*** 
(0.014) 
0.04*** 
(0.001) 
0.08*** 
(0.015) 
𝜃 0.09*** 
(0.023) 
0.08*** 
(0.023) 
0.04 
(0.030) 
0.05*** 
(0.015) 
𝜔 0.83*** 
(0.017) 
0.76*** 
0.024) 
0.82*** 
(0.027) 
0.79*** 
(0.014) 
Notes: Instruments are constant and three lags of the following variables (starting from date 𝑡 − 1): 
output gap, CPI inflation, RPI inflation, interest rate, foreign Interest rate, real exchange rate. The script 
*** and ** denote the rejection of null hypothesis of coefficient is zero at the 1% and 5% significance 
levels. Values in parentheses are strand errors using the Newey-West correction for the covariance matrix. 
 
1.4.4   Policy function estimates 
Based on the open economy IS equation estimation, it is clear that the estimates are 
consistent among three sub-sample periods, and follow the theoretical assumption of 
the A&P’s model. We now turn to the policy function estimation. UK has initially used 
RPI inflation for setting the inflation target,11 but switched to CPI in 2003. We have 
previously argued that the policy function mainly applies to the conventional monetary 
policy period. It is clear that RPI covers most of the conventional monetary policy 
period as the target measure of inflation for our sample, and therefore we choose RPI 
as our baseline case. Then, the inflation gap is equal to the difference between the 
annual change of RPI and the BoE’s inflation target rate, 2.5%. As a way to provide a 
robustness check, we also report results using CPI as the measure of inflation. However, 
when the BoE switched its inflation measure to CPI in October 2003, the target rate 
                                                 
11 The BoE actually use RPIX (RPI excluding mortgage interest payments) as the measure of inflation 
targeting. However, due to the lack of variability (see Martin and Milas, 2004), we therefore choose RPI 
as a proxy of RPIX, which is consistent with the previous empirical studies for UK data. Indeed, Clarida 
et al. (2000) show that estimating interest rate reaction function over a small sample with little variability 
in inflation would result highly misleading results. 
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was also changed to 2%. Consequently, the inflation gap for the CPI case is equal to 
the difference between the annual change of CPI and 2%. It should be noted that we 
assumed that the change of inflation target measure did not demonstrate a change in the 
policy regime. The coefficients of 𝜙  and 𝜃  are assumed as constant in the policy 
function. In order to keep the notion with the IS estimates, we use the same sub-periods 
as the IS equation estimation. We regard the period 1992Q4-2008Q3 and 1992Q4-
2007Q3 as the period for conventional monetary policy while period 1992Q4-2015Q4 
is the period includes unconventional monetary policy period. The reference values of 
𝜙 and 𝜃 in policy function for different sub-periods estimates are reported in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3: The reference values of 𝜙  and 𝜃  for the policy function 
estimates. 
 1992Q4-2007Q3 1992Q4-2008Q3 1992Q4-2015Q4 
𝜙 0.09 0.07 0.06 
𝜃 0.10 0.07 0.09 
  
  In addition, the asymmetric preference parameters α  and γ  are computed by  𝛼 =
 2𝑑2
, /𝑑1
, , 𝛾 =  2𝑑4
, /𝑑3
,
and the standard errors are obtained using the delta method 
(Oehler, 1992)12. We estimate the equation using the GMM with an optimal weighting 
matrix that accounts for possible heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation for the error 
term. In addition, the reliability of estimation depends crucially on the validity of the 
instruments, and therefore we evaluate the instruments by using the Sargan-Hansen J 
test for over-identifying restriction. The rejection of the null hypothesis demonstrates 
that the estimates are not consistent as instruments are orthogonal to the error terms, 
which implies that the set of instruments are not valid for the estimation. 
 
                                                 
12 The delta method approximates the standard errors of transformation of the coefficients using a 
first-order Taylor approximation. 
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It should be noted that the estimation of the policy function is without the dummy. 
This is due to the fact that the purpose of using dummy is to control the extreme period 
of the UK economy. However, the extreme period is not the same as the unconventional 
monetary policy period. In the previous section, we have illustrated the interest reaction 
function mainly applies to the conventional monetary period. The use of dummy is 
crucial for the IS equation to justify the normal economic period, otherwise, it will lead 
to insignificant estimates of 𝜙 and 𝜃. On the other hand, the interest reaction function 
estimates are relative stable, the use of the dummy will not change the significance for 
each sub-sample estimates. 
 
Table 1.4 reports the GMM estimates of the policy reaction function coefficient and 
the asymmetric preference parameters for the period between 1992Q4-2008Q3. Firstly, 
we can confirm that the BoE follows a nonlinear interest response to both inflation and 
output gap. Indeed, the coefficients which govern the nonlinearity in policy rule (  𝑑2 
and 𝑑4) are significantly different from zero, which implies that the hypothesis of linear 
interest rate response to the inflation rate and output gap can be rejected. Secondly, the 
negative sign of the recovered coefficients (α and γ) illustrate that the BoE has larger 
aversion to negative rather than positive output gap value (and inflation rate below the 
target level). In addition, such findings are robust for both inflation rate measures. 
Table 1.4: Reduced form Estimates of the policy function for 1992Q4-2008Q3 
 CPI RPI 
𝑑0 5.37*** 
(0.10) 
5.29*** 
(0.08) 
  𝑑1 2.50*** 
(0.71) 
1.82*** 
(0.40) 
  𝑑2 -1.69*** 
(0.32) 
-1.48*** 
(0.28) 
  𝑑3 3.49*** 
(0.71) 
3.61*** 
(0.69) 
  𝑑4 -1.20*** -1.04*** 
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Note: Instruments are the constant and five lags of the following variables (starting from date 𝑡 − 1): 
output gap, squared output gap, CPI inflation, RPI inflation, interest rate, foreign interest rate, nominal 
exchange rate. W (n) is the Wald test of joint null hypothesis of d2
, = d4
, = 0. J(m) is the statistics of 
Sargan-Hansen J test for m over-identify restriction, a rejection of null hypothesis indicates the estimates 
are not consistent. The script *** and ** denote the rejection of null hypothesis of coefficient is zero at 
1% and 5% significance levels. Values in parentheses are strand errors using the Newey-West correction 
for the covariance matrix. 
 
Compared with Table 1.4, Table 1.5 reports the sub-sample period’s results for the 
alternative conventional monetary policy period. Again, we can confirm the nonlinear 
interest response for the BoE, however, compared with the previous case, such 
nonlinear interest rate response only respect to the output gap. The 𝛾 takes the expected 
sign and consistent with the pervious case, which indicates that the BoE has higher 
tolerances of output beyond its equilibrium level than below the equilibrium level. On 
the other hand, the positive and insignificant sign of 𝛼 are found for both inflation 
measures, and therefore the asymmetric preference for inflation fluctuations did not 
exist for this period. But, there is one thing to note that the asymmetric response to 
output gap also has important implication to the inflation deviations. It is known that, 
the weak output are generally associated with the risk of future deflation or lower 
inflation. Consequently, the stronger reaction to the negative output could also due to 
the risk of future deflation, and potentially suggest that the BoE has less tolerance to 
inflation under its target rate than beyond its target rate. 
 
 
(0.22) (0.18) 
𝛼 -1.34*** 
(0.12) 
-1.64*** 
(0.21) 
𝛾 -0.68*** 
(0.03) 
-0.58*** 
(0.03) 
𝜙 0.07 0.07 
𝜃 0.07 0.07 
 𝜋∗ 2% 2.5% 
W(2) p-value 0.00 0.00 
J(31) p-value 0.11 0.18 
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Table 1.5:  Reduced form Estimates of the policy function for 1992Q4-2007Q3 
 
 
 
Note:Instruments are the constant and five lags of the following variables (starting from date 𝑡 − 1): 
output gap, squared output gap, CPI inflation, RPI inflation, interest rate, foreign interest rate, nominal 
exchange rate. W(n) is the Wald test of joint null hypothesis of d2
, = d4
, = 0. J(m) is the statistics of 
Sargan-Hansen J test for m over-identify restriction, a rejection of null hypothesis indicates the estimates 
are not consistent.. The script *** and ** denote the rejection of the null hypothesis of coefficient is zero 
at 1% and 5% significance levels. Values in parentheses are strand errors using the Newey-West 
correction for the covariance matrix. 
 
 
As we can see from the Table 1.6, once we included the unconventional monetary 
policy period, the nonlinearity of policy responses to both the output gap and inflation 
are confirmed in the case of the CPI measure. In particular, the recovered coefficients 
(α and γ) are negative and statistically different from zero. The results indicate that the 
BoE assigns more weight for inflation below its target level and output below its 
equilibrium level for the entire inflation targeting period.  
 
In contrast, the coefficients α and γ are never statistically different from zero under 
the RPI inflation measurement. For RPI case, it is not completely how these results 
should be evaluated. In particular, based on the results of the Wald test, we can reject 
the hypothesis of a linear interest rate response to inflation and output gap. However, 
 CPI RPI 
                𝑑0 5.41*** 
(0.12) 
5.21*** 
(0.07) 
  𝑑1 2.98*** 
(0.47) 
2.24*** 
(0.37) 
  𝑑2 0.90 
(0.95) 
0.60 
(0.56) 
  𝑑3 2.67*** 
(051) 
3.72*** 
(0.54) 
  𝑑4 -1.84*** 
(0.55 ) 
-2.80*** 
(0.74) 
𝛼 0.60 
(0.30) 
0.52 
(0.22) 
𝛾 -1.36*** 
(0.18) 
-1.50*** 
(0.16) 
𝜙 0.09 0.09 
𝜃 0.10 0.10 
 𝜋∗ 2% 2.5% 
W(2) p-value 0.00 0.00 
J(31) p-value 0.16 0.20 
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the recovered asymmetric coefficients 𝛼 and  γ  are not significant different from zero, 
which are not consistent with the results of the Wald test. In addition, the significant 
negative value of   𝑑1  violates the model assumption as the value of   𝑑1  should be 
greater than zero based on the model assumption. Furthermore, the over-identify 
restrictions for the validate instruments can be rejected for both measures of inflation 
at 5% significance levels. Overall, such contradictory results suggest that there are only 
limited evidence for the asymmetric monetary preference once we include the 
unconventional monetary policy period.  
 
We suspect there are two main reasons behind such counterintuitive findings. 
Firstly, during the unconventional monetary policy period, the structure of the economy 
may have changed, in which the aggregate supply and aggrade demand relations may 
differ from our theoretical framework. Therefore, the first stage IS equation estimates 
are not sufficient to capture the changes of the structural economy. Secondly, our policy 
function assumes that the central banks use the interest rate as their policy instrument. 
However, during the unconventional monetary policy period, it is clear that the policy 
instrument has changed from interest rate to money supply or other variables. Hence, 
the results are indicative of the effect of the zero lower bound on the estimation of the 
policy reaction function. 
Table 1.6: Reduced form Estimates of the policy function for 1992Q4-2015Q4 
 CPI RPI 
𝑑0 4.85*** 
(0.11) 
4.38*** 
(0.10) 
  𝑑1 0.79** 
(0.32) 
-0.69** 
(0.24) 
  𝑑2 -1.85*** 
(0.18) 
-0.41*** 
(0.12) 
  𝑑3 1.76*** 
(0.20) 
2.08*** 
(0.36) 
  𝑑4 -0.21*** 0.12 
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Note:Instruments are the constant and five lags of the following variables (starting from date 𝑡 − 1): 
output gap, squared output gap, CPI inflation, RPI inflation, interest rate, foreign interest rate, nominal 
exchange rate. W (n) is the Wald test of joint null hypothesis of d2
, = d4
, = 0. J(m) is the statistics of 
Sargan-Hansen J test for m over-identify restriction, a rejection of null hypothesis indicates the estimates 
are not consistent. The script *** and ** denote the rejection of null hypothesis of coefficient is zero at 
1% and 5% significance levels. Values in parentheses are strand errors using the Newey-West correction 
for the covariance matrix. 
 
1.5    Robustness Check 
1.5.1   Sensitivity checks for the policy function estimates 
Compared with the previous literature for studying the central bank asymmetric 
preference, their estimation strategy of policy function does not restrict the value of 𝜙 
and 𝜃  from the structure of the economy. They treat the coefficients from policy 
function as convolutions of the structural parameters of the model. However, in our 
empirical analysis, we rely on the results of IS estimation from the previous section to 
recover the asymmetric preference parameters. Therefore, our empirical analysis are 
more consistent with the UK data. However, it should be noted the standard deviations 
of the estimates of the policy function might be subject to generated regressors bias due 
to the fact that the 2nd stage estimation (policy function estimations) does not take into 
account the uncertainty from the 1st stage estimation (IS equation estimation). In order 
to deal with this problem, we check the sensitivity of the results using the estimates for 
the IS equation from the previous literature.  
 
(0.079) (0.12) 
𝛼 -4.68*** 
(0.87) 
1.20 
(0.37) 
𝛾 -0.24** 
(0.05) 
0.12 
(0.06) 
𝜙 0.06 0.06 
𝜃 0.09 0.09 
 𝜋∗ 2% 2.5% 
W(2) p-value 0.00 0.00 
J(31) p-value 0.02 0.04 
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There are two purposes for this section. Firstly, whether our estimates of open 
economy IS equation are in line with the existing literature. Secondly, whether the 
central bank asymmetric preference still exists under the different IS specifications.  
The UK empirical evidence of single IS equation estimation is limited compared with 
the US evidence. Generally speaking, the estimated values of 𝜙 are positive but below 
1 for the US, the range of empirical estimate are around 0.2 for most of the literature 
who used IV (instrumental variable) approach. But, for the UK’s case, the empirical 
evidence suggests a slightly higher value due to the openness of the UK economy. Here, 
we will discuss some empirical evidence of IS equations estimates for the UK, and cite 
theirs IS coefficients to re-estimate the policy function. 
 
Nelson and Nikolov (2004) estimate the following IS equation based on UK 
quarterly data from 1957Q1-2000Q4: 
𝑦𝑡 = −𝜙[𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ] + 𝛽(𝑔𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡+1
𝑒 ) + 𝑦𝑡+1
𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡 
Where 𝛽 denotes the steady-state of government purchase in GDP and 𝑔𝑡 is log real 
government purchase. They use the IV method to estimate the above equation, and the 
reported coefficient on ex-ante real interest rate (𝜙) is 0.086.  
 
The forward-looking IS equation has been compared empirically to the backwards-
looking version. Estrella and Fuhre (2003) have shown that the latter one can better 
describe US data. In addition, they mentioned that the forward-looking version suffered 
from the issue of stability, and conclude that backwards-looking formulation is 
somewhat more stable than forward-looking formulation. However, by estimating the 
IS equation for UK data, Kara and Nelson (2004) draw a different conclusion. Their 
estimation results suggest that forward-looking IS equation for the UK are considerably 
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more stable and interpretable than its backwards-looking counterparts. In order to test 
whether the forward-looking specification is stable and consistent with the theoretical 
prediction. They estimated two sample periods, 1957Q1-2002Q4 (𝜙 =0.0844) and 
1979Q-2002Q4 (𝜙 =0.1319), and both of samples can provide significant and correctly 
signed coefficient on the ex-ante real rate. However, for the backward looking version, 
the coefficient on expected real interest rate are incorrectly signed and insignificant. 
They also conduct the robustness check for IS equation without the government-
expenditure term, and the estimated coefficient is 0.0789, which is similar with the 
estimates that include the government spending. 
 
Furthermore, the existing literature has mainly focused on a closed economy IS 
equation because the absence of the exchange rate, however, as shown in Neiss and 
Nelson (2003), the impacts of the exchange rate on aggregate demand can be regarded 
as are being incorporated with the real interest elasticity. Consequently, they argued 
that the real interest elasticity should be higher if the IS equation contains open 
economy influences, and therefore they set 0.15 for the model calibration exercise. Kara 
and Nelson (2003) also use the same value for calibration. Furthermore, in the Bank of 
England’s Quarterly Economic Model (BEQM, 2005), they set a relative low value of 
0.05. Table 1.7 provides a brief summary of IS equation coefficients from existing 
literature, and it is clear that the results of our estimates are located in the same range 
as the previous studies. 
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Tale 1.7: The summary of IS equation coefficients from existing literature13 
Author Real Interest 
elasticity 
Method Data Sample 
Nelson and 
Nikolov (2004) 
0.086 Instrument Variables 1957Q1-2000Q4 
Kara and Nelson 
(2004) 
0.0789 Instrument Variables 1957Q1-2002Q4 
Neiss and Nelson 
(2003), Kara and 
Nelson (2003) 
0.15 Pre-set value for 
calibration 
N.A 
Bank of 
England’s 
Quarterly 
Economic Model 
(2005) 
0.05 Pre-set value for 
calibration 
N.A 
Table 1.3 
Estimates 
0.07-0.09 Instrument Variables 1992Q4-2008Q3, 
1992Q4-20007Q3 
  
The general specification of the open economy IS curve includes the real exchange 
rate, however adding real exchange rate often leads to insignificant or incorrectly signed 
coefficient.14 The results are more reasonable when longer lags are included.15 The 
potential reason for weak empirical evidence is the real exchange rate tends to be stable 
for long periods, and only move dramatically after the change in the macroeconomic 
framework. For instance, after the Global financial crisis, the British pound has 
depreciated around 25 percent in later 2008. Furthermore, the British pound has 
depreciated around 15 percent after the exit from ERM in 1992. However, the open 
economy IS equation is not able to disentangle from the negative effects associated with 
the Global financial crisis and the exit from ERM. This is also the reason why we 
introduce dummy to capture the extreme period in the previous section for open 
economy IS equation estimates. According to our results, the estimated value of 𝜃 is 
                                                 
13 We have used the annualised interest and inflation rate for estimation, and therefore the real interest 
elasticity should be 𝜙 ∗ 4 if the quarterly interest and inflation rate were used. In order to keep the same 
notion with the policy function estimation, we assume all the real interest elasticity was computed based 
on the annualised interest and inflation rate. 
14 Nelson and Nikolov (2004) has reported that the estimated coefficient on real exchange rate is only 
0.0015 and insignificant for UK data.  
15 OBR (Office for Budget Responsibility) main macroeconomics model (Murray, 2012).  
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rather close to 𝜙, and therefore we set 𝜃 equals to 𝜙 as the first scenario. For the rest of 
two, we attach relative smaller value, which are just a half and one thirds of the real 
interest elasticity. The relative small value of 𝜃 also arise because the effects of the 
exchange rate and foreign output on aggregate demand can be generally regarded as 
being incorporated in price based on past literature. The 𝜃(1) represent the case where 
the  𝜃 equals to the value of 𝜙. In addition, 𝜃(2) and  𝜃(3) depict that the 𝜃 is  half and 
one thirds to the value of 𝜙. Overall, we have four cases for robustness checks based 
on the real interest elasticity from Table 1.7, and each case attach with three different 
pre-set values of 𝜃.  
Table 1. 8: The alternative value of 𝜙 and 𝜃 for policy function estimation 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Reference Bank of 
England’s 
Quarterly 
Economic 
Model (2005) 
Kara and Nelson 
(2004) 
Nelson and 
Nikolov 
(2004) 
Neiss and 
Nelson 
(2003), 
𝜙 0.050 0.079 0.086 0.150 
𝜃(1) 0.050 0.079 0.086 0.150 
𝜃(2) 0.025 0.039 0.043 0.075 
𝜃(3) 0.016 0.026 0.028 0.050 
 
 
Due to the policy function setting, the same scenarios would generate the same 
asymmetric preference parameters across different cases. For example, as long as we 
set 𝜃 is equal to 𝜙, the value of α and γ would be the same regardless of the value of 
real interest elasticity. Here, we only report the results where the values for 𝜙 and 𝜃 are 
equivalent. We also estimate the policy function using two extreme cases where 𝜃 is 
ten times higher than the value of 𝜙 and ten times lower than the value of 𝜙, the results 
are still consistent with our previous findings16 In addition, as we only obtain reasonable 
results for 1992Q4-2015Q4 under CPI inflation measure, the robustness check for 
                                                 
16 Due to the extreme cases are not plausible for the UK economy, we do not report the results. 
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1992Q4-2105Q4 is based on CPI. For the rest of two sub-sample periods, we use RPI 
for the robustness check. 
 
Overall, our sensitivity check confirms our initial findings in the previous section 
in which the monetary preferences of the BoE have been highly asymmetric during the 
inflation targeting period. For all three sub-samples period estimates, the results are 
extremely close to its original setting in the previous section. In particular, when setting 
the interest rate, the BoE assign higher weights to the output contraction than the output 
expansion. Again, the period between 1992Q4 and 2008Q3 provides the most 
consistent result with the A&P’s model where the BoE has larger policy responses to 
negative deviations of inflation and output gap from the target value. For the period 
between 1992Q4 and 2007Q3, there is only robust evidence for asymmetric preference 
to the output gap. If we include the unconventional monetary policy period, we can only 
confirm the asymmetric preference by using CPI data, but it suffered from the issue of 
weak instruments and the asymmetric preferences are not robust for the RPI case. As a 
result, we confirm the full sample period provides the least powerful evidence for 
A&P’s model.  
Table 1.9: Reduced form Estimates of the policy function for 1992Q4-
2008Q3, alternative value of 𝜙 and θ 
 Case 1  Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
  𝑑0 5.29*** 
(0.09) 
5.29*** 
(0.09) 
5.29*** 
(0.09) 
5.29*** 
(0.09) 
  𝑑1 1.46*** 
(0.33) 
1.59*** 
(0.36) 
0.84*** 
(0.19) 
2.52*** 
(0.56) 
  𝑑2 -1.20*** 
(0.23) 
-1.31*** 
(0.25) 
-0.69*** 
(0.13) 
-2.07*** 
(0.40) 
  𝑑3 2.94*** 
(0.56) 
3.20*** 
(0.61) 
1.68*** 
(0.32) 
5.06*** 
(0.97) 
  𝑑4 -0.85*** 
(0.15) 
-0.92*** 
(0.16) 
-0.48*** 
(0.09) 
-1.47*** 
(0.26) 
𝛼 -1.64*** 
(0.21 ) 
-1.64*** 
(0.21 ) 
-1.64*** 
(0.21 ) 
-1.64*** 
(0.21 ) 
𝛾 -0.58*** 
(0.03) 
-0.58*** 
(0.03) 
-0.58*** 
(0.03) 
-0.58*** 
(0.03) 
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𝜙 0.086 0.079 0.15 0.05 
𝜃 0.086 0.079 0.15 0.05 
W(2)  p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
J(31) p-value 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Note: Case 1 indicates 𝜙=0.086 and 𝜃 = 0.086. Case 2 indicates 𝜙=0.079 and 𝜃 = 0.079. Case 3 
indicates 𝜙=0.15 and 𝜃 = 0.15. Case 4 indicates 𝜙=0.05 and 𝜃 = 0.05.Instruments are the constant and 
five lags of the following variables (starting from date  𝑡 − 1): output gap, squared output gap, CPI 
inflation, RPI inflation, interest rate, foreign interest rate, nominal exchange rate. W (n) is the Wald test 
of joint null hypothesis of d2
, = d4
, = 0. J(m) is the statistics of Sargan-Hansen J test for m over-identify 
restriction, a rejection of null hypothesis indicates the estimates are not consistent. The script *** and ** 
denote the rejection of null hypothesis of coefficient is zero at 1% and 5% significance levels. Values in 
parentheses are strand errors using the Newey-West correction for the covariance matrix. 
 
    
Table 1.10: Reduced form Estimates of the policy function for 1992Q4-2007Q3, 
alternative value of 𝜙 and θ 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
  𝑑0 5.21*** 
(0.07) 
5.21*** 
(0.07) 
5.21*** 
(0.07) 
5.21*** 
(0.07) 
  𝑑1 2.51*** 
(0.42) 
2.74*** 
(0.45) 
1.44*** 
(0.24) 
4.32*** 
(0.72) 
  𝑑2 0.67 
(0.63) 
0.73 
(0.68) 
0.38 
(0.36) 
1.15 
(1.08) 
  𝑑3 4.14*** 
(0.60) 
4.51*** 
(0.66) 
2.37*** 
(0.35) 
7.13*** 
(1.04) 
  𝑑4 -3.12*** 
(0.83) 
-3.39*** 
(0.91) 
-1.79*** 
(0.48) 
-5.36*** 
(1.43) 
𝛼 0.54 
(0.22 ) 
0.54 
(0.22 ) 
0.54 
(0.22 ) 
0.54 
(0.22 ) 
𝛾 -1.50*** 
(0.16) 
-1.50*** 
(0.16) 
-1.50*** 
(0.16) 
-1.50*** 
(0.16) 
𝜙 0.086 0.079 0.15 0.05 
𝜃 0.086 0.079 0.15 0.05 
W(2)  p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
J(31) p-value 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Note: Case 1 indicates 𝜙=0.086 and 𝜃 = 0.086. Case 2 indicates 𝜙=0.079 and 𝜃 = 0.079.Case 3 
indicates 𝜙=0.15 and 𝜃 = 0.15. Case 4 indicates 𝜙=0.05 and 𝜃 = 0.05. Instruments are the constant and 
five lags of the following variables (starting from date  𝑡 − 1): output gap, squared output gap, CPI 
inflation, RPI inflation, interest rate, foreign interest rate, nominal exchange rate. W (n) is the Wald test 
of joint null hypothesis of d2
, = d4
, = 0. J(m) is the statistics of Sargan-Hansen J test for m over-identify 
restriction, a rejection of null hypothesis indicates the estimates are not consistent. The script *** and ** 
denote the rejection of null hypothesis of coefficient is zero at 1% and 5% significance levels. Values in 
parentheses are strand errors using the Newey-West correction for the covariance matrix. 
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Table 1.11: Reduced form Estimates of the policy function for 1992Q4-2015Q4, 
alternative value of 𝜙 and θ 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
  𝑑0 4.87*** 
(0.11) 
4.87*** 
(0.11) 
4.87*** 
(0.11) 
4.87*** 
(0.11) 
  𝑑1 0.77** 
(0.32) 
0.84** 
(0.35) 
0.44** 
(0.18) 
1.33** 
(0.54) 
  𝑑2 -1.83*** 
(0.18) 
-1.99*** 
(0.1) 
-1.05*** 
(0.10) 
-3.14*** 
(0.30) 
  𝑑3 1.69*** 
(0.18) 
1.84*** 
(0.20) 
0.97*** 
(0.10) 
2.91*** 
(0.32) 
  𝑑4 -0.25*** 
(0.07) 
-0.27*** 
(0.08) 
-0.12*** 
(0.04) 
-0.43*** 
(0.12) 
𝛼 -4.70*** 
(0.88 ) 
-4.70*** 
(0.88 ) 
-4.70*** 
(0.88) 
-4.70*** 
(0.88 ) 
𝛾 -0.30*** 
(0.05) 
-0.30*** 
(0.03) 
-0.30*** 
(0.05) 
-0.30*** 
(0.05) 
𝜙 0.086 0.079 0.15 0.05 
𝜃 0.086 0.079 0.15 0.05 
W(2) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
J(31) p-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  Note: Case 1 indicates 𝜙=0.086 and 𝜃 = 0.086. Case 2 indicates 𝜙=0.079 and 𝜃 = 0.079. Case 3 
indicates 𝜙=0.15 and 𝜃 = 0.15. Case 4 indicates 𝜙=0.05 and 𝜃 = 0.05. Instruments are the constant and 
five lags of the following variables (starting from date  𝑡 − 1): output gap, squared output gap, CPI 
inflation, RPI inflation, interest rate, foreign interest rate, nominal exchange rate. W (n) is the Wald test 
of joint null hypothesis of d2
, = d4
, = 0. J(m) is the statistics of Sargan-Hansen J test for m over-identify 
restriction, a rejection of null hypothesis indicates the estimates are not consistent. The script *** and ** 
denote the rejection of null hypothesis of coefficient is zero at 1% and 5% significance levels. Values in 
parentheses are strand errors using the Newey-West correction for the covariance matrix. 
. 
 
1.5.2   Target rate or Target band? 
It should be noted that our previous empirical analysis assumes that the BoE targets 
the inflation rate to a specific rate (either 2% or 2.5%). However, the actual policy 
framework is more complicated than our settings. In detail, the BoE had a target range 
of 1-4% prior to 1995. Then, they reinterpreted the inflation target to a numerical value 
of 2.5% in 1995. Since 1997, the BoE introduced a tolerance range with 1%, which 
imply that the BoE allows inflation rate could either go 1 percent beyond or below than 
its target rate. Consequently, there are possibilities that the BoE could target the 
inflation either to its lower band or upper band instead of its official target rate. 
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On the basis of the above, we perform another robustness test. In detail, we re-
estimate the policy function by using the same empirical strategy and the pre-set values 
of θ and ϕ (see Table 1.1) as the baseline case in section 1.4.4. The only difference is 
we change the  𝜋∗ from its official inflation targeting rate to its lower band and upper 
band rate. The lower band and upper band for CPI are 1% and 3%, and are 1.5% and 
3.5% for RPI. The setting implies that the BoE has 1% tolerance level to its inflation 
target rate. 
 
  In terms of the period between 1992Q4-2008Q3, the results for the lower band are 
consistent with our baseline analysis. The BoE has nonlinear interest response to both 
inflation and output gap, and such nonlinear interest response can be quantified as the 
BoE assign higher weights to inflation below its target level and output gap below its 
equilibrium level. On the other hand, the upper band target rate provides less powerful 
evidence as we can only obtain a nonlinear interest response to the output gap. 
 
Table 1. 12: Reduced form Estimates of the policy function for 1992Q4-2008Q3, 
alternative inflation targeting rate 
 CPI  RPI  
 Lower band Upper band Lower band Upper band 
𝑑0 5.03*** 
(0.13) 
5.73*** 
(0.14) 
4.82*** 
(0.08) 
5.53*** 
(0.12) 
  𝑑1 1.48 
(1.29) 
-0.13 
(0.42) 
3.62*** 
(0.85) 
0.67 
(1.06) 
  𝑑2 -0.70** 
(0.33) 
-1.80*** 
(0.28) 
-1.19*** 
(0.35) 
-0.98** 
(0.41) 
  𝑑3 4.02*** 
(0.61) 
3.05*** 
(0.79) 
4.45*** 
(0.55) 
2.73*** 
(0.91) 
  𝑑4 -1.18*** 
(0.20) 
-1.15*** 
(0.24) 
-1.26*** 
(0.17) 
-1.05*** 
(0.24) 
𝛼 -0.94** 
(0.21) 
28.04 
(46.04) 
-0.66*** 
(0.04) 
-2.90 
(2.86) 
𝛾 -0.58*** 
(0.02) 
-0.74*** 
(0.04) 
-0.56*** 
(0.02) 
-0.76*** 
(0.07) 
𝜙 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
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Note:Instruments are the constant and five lags of the following variables (starting from date 𝑡 − 1): 
output gap, squared output gap, CPI inflation, RPI inflation, interest rate, foreign interest rate, nominal 
exchange rate. W(n) is the Wald test of joint null hypothesis of d2
, = d4
, = 0. J(m) is the statistics of 
Sargan-Hansen J test for m over-identify restriction, a rejection of null hypothesis indicates the estimates 
are not consistent. The script *** and ** denote the rejection of null hypothesis of coefficient is zero at 
1% and 5% significance levels. Values in parentheses are strand errors using the Newey-West correction 
for the covariance matrix. 
. 
 
For the period between 1992Q4 and 2007Q3, the lower band confirms the nonlinear 
interest response to the output gap but not to the inflation rate, which is consistent with 
our initial empirical findings. The BoE still has large aversions to the output gap below 
its equilibrium level under the lower band target. However, the results do not follow 
the assumption of A&P’s model. Indeed, the coefficient of   𝑑1 is positive based on the 
structure of the economy, but we obtain negative value for both inflation measures. In 
terms of the upper band, the results remains problematic for our analysis. It is clear that 
we can obtain the asymmetric preference for both inflation rate and output gap. 
However, it should be noted that the negative output gap always associate with the risk 
of deflation or low inflation.  Hence, the sign for parameters of asymmetric monetary 
policy preference should be the same. In other words, once we obtain na egative value 
of 𝛾, then the sign of 𝛼 should also be negative as it implies that the BoE weights the 
downside of the economy more than the upside. Here, we obtain the opposite sign for 
𝛼 and 𝛾 in the case of the upper  band, and therefore the implication of the results are 
not clear. 
  
𝜃 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
 𝜋∗ 1% 3% 1.5% 3.5% 
W(2) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
J(31) p-value 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.09 
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Table 1. 13: Reduced form Estimates of the policy function for 1992Q4-2007Q3, 
alternative inflation targeting rate 
Note:Instruments are the constant and five lags of the following variables (starting from date 𝑡 − 1): 
output gap, squared output gap, CPI inflation, RPI inflation, interest rate, foreign interest rate, nominal 
exchange rate. W(n) is the Wald test of joint null hypothesis of d2
, = d4
, = 0. J(m) is the statistics of 
Sargan-Hansen J test for m over-identify restriction, a rejection of null hypothesis indicates the estimates 
are not consistent. The script *** and ** denote the rejection of null hypothesis of coefficient is zero at 
1% and 5% significance levels. Values in parentheses are strand errors using the Newey-West correction 
for the covariance matrix. 
. 
 
 
If we include the unconventional monetary policy period for the policy function 
estimation, the results again provide the least evidence for the nonlinear interest 
response. In addition, the results do not provide a better interpretation of the policy 
reaction function compared with our baseline case. For the lower band, although there 
are nonlinear interest responses to inflation for CPI and output gap for RPI, we are only 
able to quantify the nonlinearities for CPI as the coefficients govern the asymmetric 
preference are both insignificant for RPI. For the upper band, we obtain the significant 
and negative values of  𝑑1, which again violate the model assumption.   
 CPI  RPI  
 Lower band Upper band Lower band Upper band 
𝑑0 5.29*** 
(0.08) 
7.18*** 
(0.20) 
4.96*** 
(0.10) 
6.09*** 
(0.12) 
  𝑑1 -4.17*** 
(1.32) 
12.52*** 
(1.87) 
-0.14 
(1.03) 
5.24*** 
(1.20) 
  𝑑2 3.38*** 
(0.78) 
3.97*** 
(0.76) 
1.04* 
(0.60) 
1.22** 
(0.50) 
  𝑑3 2.46*** 
(0.58) 
1.31** 
(0.57) 
4.08*** 
(0.50) 
3.25*** 
(0.62) 
  𝑑4 -1.41** 
(0.55) 
-1.44*** 
(0.50) 
-3.13*** 
(0.77) 
-3.20*** 
(0.62) 
𝛼 -1.62*** 
(0.09) 
0.62*** 
(0.01) 
-14.50 
(48.19) 
0.46*** 
(0.04) 
𝛾 -1.14*** 
(0.18) 
-2.20*** 
(0.38) 
-1.54*** 
(0.16) 
-1.96*** 
(0.16) 
𝜙 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
𝜃 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
 𝜋∗ 1% 3% 1.5% 3.5% 
W(2) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
J(31) p-value 0.15 0.20 0.19 0.28 
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Table 1. 14: Reduced form Estimates of the policy function for 1992Q4-2015Q4, 
alternative inflation targeting rate 
Note:Instruments are the constant and five lags of the following variables (starting from date 𝑡 − 1): 
output gap, squared output gap, CPI inflation, RPI inflation, interest rate, foreign interest rate, nominal 
exchange rate. W(n) is the Wald test of joint null hypothesis of d2
, = d4
, = 0. J(m) is the statistics of 
Sargan-Hansen J test for m over-identify restriction, a rejection of null hypothesis indicates the estimates 
are not consistent. The script *** and ** denote the rejection of null hypothesis of coefficient is zero at 
1% and 5% significance levels. Values in parentheses are strand errors using the Newey-West correction 
for the covariance matrix. 
. 
 
Overall, using the lower band and upper band of the inflation target rate do not 
provide better results for the central bank’s asymmetric preference. In particular, the 
results of the lower band for 1992Q-2007Q4 and the upper band for 1992Q4-2015Q4 
are not intuitive as those results violate the model’s assumption. Hence, we conclude 
that in practice the BoE follows its official inflation target rate. 
 
 
1.6   Conclusion 
This paper has investigated a nonlinear optimal monetary policy model for the BoE 
within the context of an open economy framework. By doing so, we follow the 
 CPI  RPI  
 Lower band Upper band Lower band Upper band 
𝑑0 4.52*** 
(0.13) 
4.73*** 
(0.13) 
4.72*** 
(0.11) 
4.21*** 
(0.13) 
  𝑑1 1.32 
(1.07) 
-2.07*** 
(0.46) 
-0.95*** 
(0.22) 
-1.13*** 
(0.30) 
  𝑑2 -1.02*** 
(0.36) 
-1.79*** 
(0.21) 
-0.14** 
(0.06) 
-0.57*** 
(0.21) 
  𝑑3 1.93*** 
(0.30) 
2.18*** 
(0.30) 
2.29*** 
(0.37) 
1.90*** 
(0.53) 
  𝑑4 -0.09 
(0.10) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
-0.11 
(0.15) 
0.27 
(0.18) 
𝛼 -1.54** 
(0.36) 
1.72*** 
(0.15) 
0.28 
(0.10) 
1.02*** 
(0.19) 
𝛾 -0.10 
(0.06) 
-0.10 
(0.05) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
0.28 
(0.11) 
𝜙 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
𝜃 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
 𝜋∗ 1% 3% 1.5% 3.5% 
W(2) p-value 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 
J(31) p-value 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 
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theoretical framework suggest by A&P. In contrast with the existing literature,  A&P’s 
model considers the exchange rate effects of the monetary policy preferences, and more 
importantly, the model explains the reported asymmetric exchange rate responses based 
on the asymmetric monetary policy preference. This feature is crucial for the UK 
economy as the movement of the British pound can be characterised as asymmetric 
from the previous empirical studies. 
 
We estimate the policy reaction function for the BoE using the GMM method. As 
there is no strong information about the structural parameters in the policy function, we 
firstily perform an open economy IS estimation to obtain the structural parameters. 
Then, replacing the structural parameters in the policy function by using the estimated 
value from IS estimates to conducting the second stage estimation (policy function 
estimation). The data is on quarterly basis and span the period from 1992Q4 to 2015Q4. 
Due to the structural change of the monetary policy in the financial crisis, we estimate 
the policy function for three sub-sample periods, 1992Q4-2007Q3, 1992Q4-2008Q3 
and 1992Q4-2015Q4. The first two periods are the conventional monetary policy period 
while the last period covers the unconventional monetary policy period. For the 
conventional monetary policy period, the empirical evidence suggests that the negative 
output gap trigger larger policy responses than positive output gap of the same size for 
the BoE. In addition, we also found the BoE is more averse to the negative inflation gap 
rather than the positive inflation gap, but only occurs for 1992Q4-2008Q3 not for 
1992Q4-2007Q3. It is known that the negative output is always accompanied with the 
risk of future deflation or low inflation, the larger aversion to negative output may 
reflect the BoE also assign more weight on the negative inflation gap. Thus, our results 
for 1992Q4-2007Q3 also reflect the fact that the BoE may have larger aversions to the 
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negative inflation gap than positive inflation gap. Overall, we conclude that the BoE 
has larger policy responses to the downside of the economy than the upside of the 
economy during the conventional monetary policy period. Once we include the 
unconventional monetary period for our policy function estimates, the evidence of 
asymmetric monetary policy preferences is not robust as there is an inconsistency 
between CPI and RPI inflation measures and the hypothesis of invalid instruments 
cannot be rejected.  
 
In addition, although the BoE targets the inflation to a specific numerical value, we 
consider the possibility that the BoE could target the inflation rate to its upper band 
level or lower band level. This arises because the BoE has introduced a tolerance range 
for its numerical target rate. By re-estimating the policy reaction function using the 
lower band and upper band of inflation, the results are less powerful and seem 
inconsistent with the model’s assumption. Consequently, we argue that the target rate 
of 2.5% (or 2% for CPI) is more plausible to investigate the BoE’s monetary policy 
within the context of an open economy framework. 
 
Furthermore, I suggest two points for the further research. First, it should be noted 
that the standard deviations of the policy function estimates might be subject to 
generated regressors bias due to the fact that the policy function estimates do not take 
into account the uncertainty from the IS equation estimates. In order to address this 
issue, we conduct sensitivity checks for the policy function estimates using the 
estimates for the IS equation from the previous literature. But, there is a more robust 
approach to address this issue. In detail, we can conduct a bootstrap exercise for the two 
regressions and compute confidence intervals for the estimates to address the possible 
issue of generated regression bias. Thus, we can better control the uncertainty of the IS 
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estimation, and strength the findings from the policy function estimates. Secondly, the 
A&P model applies to a small open economy that operates credible inflation targeting 
monetary policy. There is no reason to investigate the model only for the BoE, and 
therefore we suggest that A&P’s model could expand to a set of countries who have 
similar monetary policy framework with the BoE. 
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Chapter 2 
Out-of-sample Exchange Rate Predictability with 
Asymmetric Monetary Preferences 
2.1 Introduction 
It is well known that there is a missing link between the exchange rate and economic 
or financial fundamentals. Past literature has found that the exchange rate is extremely 
difficult to predict using macroeconomic fundamentals. In particular, there is no strong 
empirical evidence that macroeconomic fundamentals can provide better forecasting 
performance than a naive random walk. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) describe this 
phenomenon as “exchange rate disconnect puzzle.” 
 
The exchange rate disconnect puzzle has received numerous attention from 
previous literature, and many of them have reported positive results for economic 
exchange rate models. However, these findings are still questionable. For example, 
Sarno and Taylor (2000) state that "Overall, the conclusion emerges that, although 
the theory of exchange rate determination has produced a number of plausible 
models, empirical work on exchange rates still has not produced models that are 
sufficiently satisfactory to be considered reliable and robust.”  
 
Since the late 2000s, the literature has reported some positive results by 
implementing new macroeconomic fundamentals or more powerful test statistics. 
Recently, the literature has reached a consensus that the empirical evidence is not 
favourable to traditional economic model such as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), 
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Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIRP) and monetary models. But, there is a consensus 
that Taylor rule fundamentals has more out-of-sample predictability than the traditional 
economic models, and can outperform a naive random walk (Rossi 2014).  
 
Taylor rule is a monetary policy rule initiated by Taylor (1993). It shows that the 
central bank sets interest rate in response to change in inflation and the output gap. If 
two economies follow Taylor rule and subtracting a Taylor rule for the foreign country 
from a Taylor for the domestic country, we can obtain an equation of the interest rate 
differential. As UIRP shows that their bilateral exchange rate is determined by their 
interest rate differential, then, we can replace the interest rate differential in the UIRP 
by their inflation levels and output gaps. Thus, a Taylor rule exchange rate equation is 
derived. 
 
The present study challenges the Taylor rule fundamentals from the following 
perspectives. The main implication of Taylor rule fundamentals is it shows that the 
increase (decrease) in domestic inflation generate forecasts of exchange rate 
appreciation (depreciation), which is consistent with the past empirical evidence that 
bad news of inflation is good news for the exchange rate. However, past empirical 
evidence also suggests the relationship described above is not linear but subject to sign 
effects. The depreciation following bad news of inflation are larger than the 
appreciation following the good inflation news, and therefore this phenomenon can be 
described as asymmetric exchange rate responses under inflation announcements.  
 
It is clear that the Taylor rule only assumes that interest rate is a linear function of 
the output gap and inflation, and therefore the Taylor rule based fundamentals cannot 
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capture the asymmetric exchange rate responses. In order to capture the asymmetric 
exchange rate behaviour in responses to the deviations of output gap and inflation, we 
first extend the conventional Taylor rule exchange rate model. Compared with the 
standard Taylor rule exchange rate model, we present an augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals based on a nonlinear monetary policy rule, in which exchange rate is not 
only a function of inflation and output gaps but also a function of their squared value. 
This specification allows us to determine the exchange rate using the assumption of 
asymmetric exchange rate responses. Secondly, given the fact that the empirical 
evidence of asymmetric exchange rate responses is more significant for inflation 
targeting countries, we investigate the out-of-sample exchange rate predictability of the 
augmented Taylor rule fundamentals for six inflation targeting countries exchange rate 
(Australia, Canada, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK) relative to the United 
States dollar. In order to test the out-of-sample exchange rate predictability, we estimate 
the augmented Taylor rule fundamental by OLS in rolling regression and use the CW 
statistic (Clark and West, 2006) 17  to examine the exchange rate predictability. In 
addition, as a way to provide a robustness check, we also report the DMW statistic (see 
Diebold and Mariano, 1995, and West 1996) and the ratio of the root mean squared 
forecasted error (RMSFE) of the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals to that of the 
random walk model.  
 
  We consider four sub-periods for our estimates, the full available sample, the 
whole inflation targeting period, the conventional monetary policy period (after the 
introduction of inflation targeting regime but prior to the zero lower bound period), and 
the unconventional monetary policy period (the period of zero lower bound). The 
                                                 
17 The CW statistic is explained further in the chapter, please see section 2.4.2. 
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reason for using sub-periods is the monetary policy may experience several policy shifts 
during the last three decades, therefore, the explanatory power of the augmented Taylor 
rule may differ for each sub-period. For instance, the empirical evidence suggests that 
the asymmetric exchange rate responses are more significant after the introduction of 
the inflation targeting regime, however, with the introduction of QE and interest rate 
enters the zero lower bound, such asymmetric exchange rate responses may be 
questionable during and after the recent financial crisis. Hence, it is important to check 
whether the exchange rate predictability can survive after the financial crisis or before 
the adoption of inflation targeting regime. For comparison purposes, we also evaluate 
the out-of-sample exchange rate predictability for Taylor rule fundamentals and interest 
rate fundamentals. 
 
Our empirical results illustrate the role of asymmetric exchange rate responses are 
essential for determining the exchange rate movement. By using the CW statistic to 
evaluate the out-of-sample performances, the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals can 
provide stronger evidence of exchange rate predictability than the Taylor rule 
fundamentals during the conventional monetary policy period. However, the exchange 
rate predictability for augmented Taylor rule fundamentals falls apart when we include 
the pre-inflation targeting period or the unconventional monetary policy period. On the 
other hand, Taylor rule fundamentals can maintain its predictability when we included 
both periods.  In addition, the evidence of exchange rate predictability is much lower 
for the interest rate fundamentals 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the past 
literature for Taylor rule fundamentals. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical framework 
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for standard Taylor rule fundamentals and augmented Taylor rule fundamentals. 
Section 2.4 shows the data and methodology while section 2.5 shows the estimation 
strategy and the empirical results, and the conclusion is represented in section 2.6. 
2.2 Literature review 
In the last ten years, existing studies have illustrated that the Taylor rule 
fundamentals is able to provide better exchange rate predictability than the random walk 
model, and it has become the dominant model for exchange rate forecasting literature. 
Molodtsova and Papell (2009)   show that Taylor rule fundamentals can provide strong 
short-run evidence of exchange rate predictability. They evaluate the exchange rate 
predictability using the CW statistic for 12 OECD countries relative to the United States 
over the post-Bretton Woods period. At the one-month horizon, they found that there 
are 11 out of 12 currencies have evidence of exchange rate predictability at 5 percent 
significance levels. On the other hand, the evidence of exchange rate predictability for 
PPP, interest rate fundamentals and monetary model is much weak compared with the 
Taylor rule fundamentals.   
 
However, there is a data issue for evaluating the out-of-sample exchange rate 
predictability using economic fundamentals. This issue arises because the data of main 
macroeconomic variables (such as GDP) are continuously revised by statistical 
agencies. Therefore, empirical analysis based on revised data often generates different 
conclusion for those based on real-time data (Croushore and Stark, 2003). In order to 
address this issue, Molodtsova et al. (2008) use real-time data to estimate Taylor rule 
fundamentals for the US and Germany from 1979. Their empirical results suggest that 
the out-of-sample exchange rate predictability for Taylor rule fundamentals is robust 
for using real-time data, and the evidence with real-time data are even stronger than the 
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evidence with revised data. In addition, Molodtsova et al. (2011) show similar evidence 
for evaluating Taylor rule fundamentals exchange rate predictability of dollar/euro 
exchange rate by using the real-time data. 
 
Another issue with Taylor rule fundamentals is whether the Taylor rule variables 
are still relevant after the recent financial crisis. It is clear that the Taylor rule assumes 
the short-term interest rate as the main policy instrument. However, this assumption 
may collapse after the recent financial crisis. As the interest rates in major advanced 
economies have been at the zero lower bound along with the introduction of QE, it is 
more reasonable to assume the change in the level of money supply as the main 
monetary policy instrument rather than changes in the interest rate. Consequently, an 
important question to explore is whether the exchange rate predictability of Taylor rule 
fundamental can still hold when the date extended to the post-unconventional monetary 
policy period (Chinn 2008).  Ince et al. (2016) extend the data of Molodtsova and Papell 
(2009) to December 2014, and find the out-of-sample exchange rate predictability of 
Taylor rule fundamentals does not collapse even if the periods of the financial crisis 
and zero lower bound are included in the sample. Furthermore, in order to analyse the 
out-of-sample exchange rate predictability during the financial crisis, Molodtsova and 
Papell (2013) modified the Taylor rule fundamentals by including the financial stress 
variable in the Taylor rule. For their empirical analysis, although the out-of-sample 
exchange rate predictability for Taylor rule fundamentals does not fall apart during the 
financial crisis, the modified Taylor rule fundamentals that incorporate financial 
condition variables outperform the original Taylor rule fundamentals.  
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  It should be noted that the positive empirical evidence of Taylor rule fundamentals 
depends on the choice of evaluation methods. In particular, the reported evidence of 
exchange rate predictability for Taylor rule fundamentals is only significant for CW 
statistic, although with the exceptions. Rogoff and Stavrakeva (2008) have pointed out 
that the successful results by using CW statistic do not necessarily mean that the Taylor 
rule fundamentals has forecasting ability.  The forecasting ability only occurs when the 
mean squared forecasted error (MSFE) for the alternative model (Taylor rule 
fundamentals) is significantly less than the MSFE for the null model. However, the 
predictability occurs when the coefficients on the alternative model are significantly 
different from zero in a regression, and therefore, is not equivalent to forecasting 
content. Therefore, Molodtsova (2009) stated that the positive results based on CW 
statistic only imply exchange rate predictability rather than forecast ability. Overall, the 
evidence of exchange rate predictability does not mean that the model would be useful 
for exchange rate market.  
 
2.3 Taylor rule fundamental 
2.3.1  Standard Taylor rule fundamentals 
The idea of Taylor fundamental model of exchange rates is linking the exchange 
rate with a set of fundamentals based on a Taylor rule for monetary policy. Here, we 
will discuss and adopt the approach from 7, (hereafter, M&P). 
Taylor (1993) proposed the idea that the central bank sets the interest rate as a 
function of how inflation deviates from its target level and also as a function of how 
actual output differs from its potential level, and therefore Taylor rule can be specified 
as:  
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𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜔(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗) + 𝛽𝑦𝑡 + 𝑟
∗  (1.1) 
Where 𝑖𝑡
∗  is the target nominal interest rate, 𝜋𝑡 is the inflation rate, 𝜋𝑡
∗ is the target 
inflation rate, 𝑦𝑡 is the output gap (deviation of actual real GDP from its potential level) 
and 𝑟∗ is the equilibrium real interest rate. Taylor rule demonstrates that the central 
bank will increase the target for the nominal interest rate if inflation above its target 
level (and/or actual output above its potential level). By combing the parameters 𝑟∗ and 
𝜔𝜋𝑡
∗ into one constant term 𝜇, we can have the following equation:  
𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝜇 + 𝛼𝜋𝑡 + 𝛽𝑦𝑡    (1.2) 
 
Where 𝜇 = 𝑟∗ − 𝜔𝜋𝑡
∗. M&P adjusted the equation (1.2) by taking into account two facts 
from the past literature. According to the open economy setting suggested by Svensson 
(2000), central banks try to maintain the exchange rates at its purchasing power parity 
level. As the result, they add the real exchange rate to equation (1.2). In addition, they 
include a lagged dependent variable to capture interest rate smoothing, which reflects 
the fact that the interest rate changes are gradually as central banks do not want to 
overachieve their target (see Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998). Accordingly, we obtain 
the following equation: 
𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌) ∗ (𝜇 + 𝛼𝜋𝑡 + 𝛽𝑦𝑡 + 𝛾𝑞𝑡) + 𝜌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡 (1.3) 
 
Where 𝑞𝑡 denotes the real exchange rate  and 𝜖𝑡 is the monetary policy shock. Equation 
(1.3) is the adjusted Taylor rule for all countries except for the United States. As 𝛾 is 
equals to zero for the United States, the Taylor rule for the US as follows: 
𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌) ∗ (𝜇 + 𝛼𝜋𝑡 + 𝛽𝑦𝑡) + 𝜌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡 (1.4) 
 
  By subtracting the adjusted Taylor rule for the foreign country from that for the US 
and redefine the coefficients, we can obtain the following equation: 
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𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
𝑓 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜋𝑡 − 𝜑2𝜋𝑡
𝑓 + 𝜑3𝑦𝑡 − 𝜑4𝑦𝑡
𝑓 − 𝜑5𝑞𝑡 + 𝜑6𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜑7𝑖𝑡−1
𝑓 + 𝑢𝑡 (1.5) 
 
Where 𝑓 denotes the foreign variables and 𝜑0 is a constant. 
 
According to uncovered interest parity (UIRP) condition: 
 
(1 + 𝑖𝑡) =
𝑠𝑡+1
𝑒
𝑠𝑡
(1 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑓) (1.6) 
 
Where 𝑠𝑡 is the nominal exchange rate between the dollar and foreign currency and 𝑖𝑡
𝑓
 
is the foreign interest rate. The increase of 𝑠𝑡 means the deprecation of dollar. The 
superscript 𝑒 represent the expectation of the variable. By taking log for the both sides: 
𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
𝑓 = ∆𝑠𝑡+1
𝑒  (1.7) 
 
Then, we can derive an exchange rate forecasting equation by substituting the 
interest rate differential out using equation (1.5),  
∆𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜋𝑡 − 𝜑2𝜋𝑡
𝑓 + 𝜑3𝑦𝑡 − 𝜑4𝑦𝑡
𝑓 − 𝜑5𝑞𝑡
𝑓 + 𝜑6𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜑7𝑖𝑡−1
𝑓 + 𝜀𝑡 (1.8) 
 
Under UIRP condition and rational expectations, any event that causes the Fed to 
raise the Fed funds rate will produce immediate appreciation of the dollar and 
forecasted depreciation of the dollar. However, there is preponderant evidence to 
suggest that the UIRP does not hold in the short run. The past literature has discussed 
the violation of UIRP condition extensively, and pointed out two outstanding puzzles 
in the context of international macroeconomics, which are forward premium puzzle (see 
Chinn, 2006) and delayed overshooting puzzle (see Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995). By 
now, there is still no complete answer to these two puzzles, but some literature does 
provide meaningful explanations. For example, Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) show 
that if investor misperceived the persistence of interest rate shock, an increase in the 
interest rate can produce sustained exchange rates appreciation. 
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Therefore, based on both empirical and theoretical evidence, M&P argue that it is 
more reasonable to assume that any events cause the monetary authority to increase its 
interest rate will lead to immediate and forecasted appreciation of its domestic currency.  
It is clear that the signs of the coefficients in equation (1.8) violate the past empirical 
evidence of UIRP as it reflects the fact that any event that causes the monetary authority 
to raise the domestic interest rate will produce immediate appreciation and forecasted 
depreciation of the domestic currency. Hence, M&P show that the signs of the 
coefficients in equation (1.8) should be reversed, which give the following equation: 
∆𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝜃0 − 𝜃1𝜋𝑡 + 𝜃2𝜋𝑡
𝑓 − 𝜃3𝑦𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑦𝑡
𝑓 + 𝜃5𝑞𝑡
𝑓 − 𝜃6𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜃7𝑖𝑡−1
𝑓 + 𝜀𝑡 (1.9) 
 
2.3.2  Augmented Taylor rule fundamentals 
Past literature has demonstrated that the announcements of inflation rate have 
significant effects on the change of exchange rate and summarized two stylized facts of 
the exchange rate effects of inflation announcements. Firstly, the positive inflation 
surprises (when actual inflation is announced to have exceeded than its expected value) 
will be followed by an appreciation of the domestic currency (Conrad and Lamla, 2010). 
This fact clearly goes against the prediction of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), as 
the increase of the inflation should lead to a depreciation of the domestic currency. Such 
inconsistency could explain on the basis of a credible inflation-targeting monetary 
policy. If expectations are well anchored to a credible inflation target, positive inflation 
surprise triggers an increase in short-term domestic interest rate, which leads to an 
increase in the real return of the domestic currency. Then, in turns, cause a domestic 
currency appreciation. In addition, it should be noted that such effects have to be strong 
enough to counterbalance the PPP effects, which tends to depreciate the domestic 
currency on the impacts of positive inflation surprise.  
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Secondly, the relationship described above is not linear but subject to sign effects. 
The depreciations following the negative inflation surprise (actual inflation is less than 
its expected value) are larger in absolute values, and strong statistical significance, than 
the appreciations following the positive inflation surprise. Therefore, we call such non-
linear relationship as asymmetric exchange rate responses under inflation surprises. 
 
In particular, Clarida and Waldman (2008) evaluate these two stylized facts using a 
ten-country sample, which includes eight inflation targeting countries and two non-
inflation targeting countries. Their empirical findings can be concluded as follows. 
Firstly, they found both stylized facts are significant for the inflation targeting countries. 
However, there are no significant effects of inflation announcements on the nominal 
exchange rate for the non-inflation targeting countries. In addition, there is evidence of 
regime change for the inflation targeting countries. In particular, the estimated 
coefficient between inflation rate and the exchange rate is only positive (the positive 
inflation surprise leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency) and significant 
during the inflation targeting period. However, prior to the inflation targeting period, 
the estimated coefficient becomes negative and statistically insignificant. Overall, the 
two stylized facts that described above are more significant for inflation targeting 
countries than non-inflation targeting countries. 
 
Arghyrou and Pourpourides (2016) provide a theoretical explanation for the 
asymmetric exchange rate response. They show that such asymmetric exchange rate 
response is caused by the central bank’s asymmetric monetary policy preference. To be 
specific, if central bank has larger aversions to inflation rate under its target level 
(and/or actual output gap under its potential level) than inflation rate greater than its 
 67 
 
target level (and/or actual output gap beyond its potential level). Then, under a credible 
inflation targeting regime, they will reduce the interest rate more heavily when interest 
rates need to be reduced to meet the inflation target than increase the interest rate when 
interest rate must be increased to meet the same target. Markets can anticipate the 
difference in the adjustment of the nominal interest rate, they will sell higher volumes 
of the domestic currency when the negative inflation surprise occurs than the volumes 
they are willing to buy when the positive inflation surprise occurs, and thus, such 
behaviours lead to asymmetric exchange rate response to inflation surprises. 
 
It is clear that the Taylor rule (equation 1.3) assumes that the central bank only has 
a symmetric preference when setting the interest rate, which cannot capture the 
asymmetric monetary preference, and the potential asymmetric exchange rate response 
caused by the asymmetric monetary preference.  Following A&P.s theoretical 
justification, we derive a forecasting equation for inflation targeting country under the 
assumption that policymakers have asymmetric. In order to derive such forecasting 
equation, we first adopt an interest rate reaction function suggest by Surico (2007). In 
detail, Surico (2007) derive an optimal monetary policy rule based on a linear 
exponential (Linex) loss function and a linear structure of the economy, the optimal 
policy rule reads18: 
−𝑑1[𝑒
𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗) − 1] − 𝑑2(𝑒
𝛾𝑦𝑡 − 1) + 𝑑3(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖
∗) = 0 (2.0) 
 
By using the Taylor approximation to simplify the exponential terms in the optimal 
policy rule, we obtain the following interest rate reaction function for the inflation 
targeting country: 
𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌) ∗ [𝑐0 + 𝑐1(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) + 𝑐2(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)2 + 𝑐3𝑦𝑡 + 𝑐4(𝑦𝑡)
2 + 𝑐5𝑞𝑡] + 𝜌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 
(2.1) 
                                                 
18 See Appendix 3 for the derivation of optimal policy rule. 
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Where 𝜋∗  is the inflation targeting rate and 𝑐0  is the equilibrium interest rate  𝑖
∗ . 
Compared with equation (1.3), an important feature for equation (2.1) is that it allows 
central bank respond to the squared values of inflation and output gap, which is different 
from the conventional monetary policy rule suggested by Taylor rule (1983) where the 
central banks only respond the level of inflation and output gap. A negative coefficient 
on the squared terms means that the interest rate easing required by inflation rate below 
its target level (or output gap contraction) of a given size are greater than interest rate 
tightening caused by inflation rate greater than its target level (or output expansions) of 
the same magnitude, and such asymmetric interest responses lead to an asymmetric 
objective on the inflation rate (or output) for the central bank.  
 
In addition, as the Fed does not have an explicit inflation target, the interest rate 
reaction function for the Fed remain the same, and follows equation (1.4). Then, 
through the UIRP condition, we can derive the following exchange rate forecasting 
equation between the US and inflation targeting country: 
∆𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑑0 + 𝑑1𝜋𝑡 − 𝑑2(𝜋𝑡
𝑓 − 𝜋𝑓∗) + 𝑑3𝑦𝑡 − 𝑑4𝑦𝑡
𝑓 − 𝑑5(𝜋𝑡
𝑓 − 𝜋𝑓∗)
2
− 𝑑6(𝑦𝑡
𝑓)
2
− 𝑑7𝑞𝑡
𝑓 +
𝑑8𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑑9𝑖𝑡−1
𝑓 + 𝜀𝑡  (2.2) 
If we follow M&P’s presumptions that any events cause the monetary authority to 
increase its interest rate will lead to immediate and forecasted appreciation of its 
domestic currency. The signs of the coefficients in equation (2.2) should also be 
reversed. Accordingly, the forecasting equation for the augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals reads: 
∆𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑑0−𝑑1𝜋𝑡 + 𝑑2(𝜋𝑡
𝑓 − 𝜋𝑓∗) − 𝑑3𝑦𝑡 + 𝑑4𝑦𝑡
𝑓 + 𝑑5(𝜋𝑡
𝑓 − 𝜋𝑓∗)
2
+ 𝑑6(𝑦𝑡
𝑓)
2
+ 𝑑7𝑞𝑡
𝑓 −
𝑑8𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑑9𝑖𝑡−1
𝑓 + 𝜀𝑡  (2.3) 
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Where 𝑠𝑡  is the log of the nominal exchange rate, the nominal exchange rate is 
expressed as the dollar price of one unit foreign currency, and therefore the increase in 
𝑠𝑡 denotes a depreciation of the dollar. The coefficients 𝑑5 and 𝑑6 are crucial for the 
augmented Taylor rule fundamentals. The negative value of 𝑑5 (𝑑6) illustrates that the 
forecasted deprecation of the foreign currency caused by foreign inflation rate below 
its target level (foreign output contraction) of a given size are greater than the forecasted 
appreciation of the foreign currency caused by foreign inflation rate greater than its 
target level (foreign output expansion) of the same magnitude. Since the equation (2.3) 
is able to capture the asymmetric exchange rate responses, we call this equation (2.3) 
as an augmented Taylor rule fundamentals for the exchange rates while equation (1.9) 
can be labelled as a standard Taylor rule fundamentals models of the exchange rates. 
 
It should be noted that the signs of coefficients for equation (2.3) have two problems. 
First, as the empirical work on UIRP and the existence of the carry trade suggest that 
UIRP does not hold in the short run and may only hold in the long run, it is not clear 
for the coefficients on the interest differentials in the UIRP condition. In addition, there 
is no strong prior information about the coefficients that govern the asymmetric 
monetary preferences (𝑑5 and 𝑑6) as well as the coefficients for other variables. In other 
words, there is not a strong prior that the signs of the coefficients in equation (2.3) are 
correct. Consequently, we estimate equation (2.3) without restricting the signs of the 
coefficients. 
 
Furthermore, as there is no consensus for interest rate smoothing and the real 
exchange rate targeting, we follow M&P’s approach, and set four specifications for 
Taylor rule fundamentals. We call Taylor rule fundamentals as asymmetric if the 
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foreign central bank targets the real exchange rate. Otherwise, it is symmetric. In 
addition, the model is smoothing if a lagged interest rate variable is included. Otherwise, 
it is no smoothing. Overall, we will have four specifications:  asymmetric with no 
smoothing (where 𝑑8 and 𝑑9 are equal to zero), symmetric with no smoothing (where 
𝑑7, 𝑑8 and 𝑑9 are equal to zero), asymmetric with smoothing (identical to equation 2.3) 
and symmetric with smoothing (where 𝑑7 is equal to zero). 
2.3.3  Interest rate fundamentals 
For comparison purposes, we also consider the interest rate fundamentals for out-
of-sample forecasts. Under the UIRP condition, the nominal interest rate differential is 
equal to the expected change in the log exchange rate. Accordingly, the forecasting 
equation based on UIRP reads: 
∆𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝜑 + 𝜓(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
𝑓) + 𝜉𝑡  (2.4) 
As we mentioned above, the past literature suggests that the UIRP may only hold in 
the long run, and clearly does not hold in short-run. Therefore, we follow Clark and 
West (2006), and equation (2.4) is estimated without restricting the coefficients on the 
interest rate differentials.  
 
2.4   Data and Methodology  
2.4.1 Data 
We investigate out-of-sample exchange rate predictability of standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals and augmented Taylor rule fundamentals for the US dollar against six 
inflation targeting countries-Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the 
UK. These countries are using formal frameworks of inflation targeting regime, which 
means the inflation targeting is set by secondary legislation or voluntary agreement with 
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the government. Some central banks like European Central Bank or Bank of Japan also 
use the elements of the inflation targeting regime, but they either without official 
inflation targeting rate or have other policy goals such as economic growth or 
unemployment rate. As a result, we exclude the countries who only partially adopt the 
inflation targeting regime. 
 
The models are estimated using monthly data. We use the bilateral nominal 
exchange rate (relative to US dollar) from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis to 
represent the exchange rate term. The exchange rate is defined as the domestic price 
(US dollar) for a unit of foreign currency, therefore, an increase in the exchange rate is 
a depreciation of the domestic currency (US dollar). In addition, the inflation is 
measured as the annual change of the CPI,19 and the interest rate is measured by the 
money market rate. Both inflation and interest rate are taken from the OECD database. 
Due to the GDP only available on the quarterly basis, we follow the previous literature 
by using the industrial production index as a proxy of GDP. We use the Hodrick-
Prescott cyclical component (HP filter) of the industrial production index to 
constructing the output gap.  For the empirical analysis, we evaluate three forecasting 
models, interest rate fundamentals (equation 2.4), standard Taylor rule fundamentals 
(equation 1.9) and augmented Taylor rule fundamentals (equation 2.3).  The out-of-
sample forecasts are computed by the rolling window approach. 
                                                 
19 Although the BoE is using CPI measure to targeting inflation since 2003, we use RPI (Retail Price 
Index) inflation for UK as the Bank of England targeted the inflation by using RPI between 1992 and 
2003, which accounts a longer period than CPI before the Financial Crisis. 
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2.4.2 Forecast comparison based on MSFE 
We evaluate the out-of-sample forecasting performance by comparing the MSFE 
between the null model and the preferred model. The null model is a zero mean 
martingale difference process, and the alternative model is a linear model. 
 
The null model (Model 1): 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 
 
The alternative model (Model 2): 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽𝑋𝑡
, + 𝑒𝑡  where 𝐸𝑡(𝑒𝑡+1) = 0 
 
The vector 𝑋  represents the variables in the forecasting equation. Suppose the 
sample consists of T + 1observations, and the last P (where P < T) observations are 
used for predictions. Estimating forecasting model by OLS from 𝑡 = 1, . . . . . , 𝑅 (where 
𝑅 is the width of window), and therefore each model is initially estimated using the first 
𝑅 data points.  Then, using the estimated coefficients to construct one-month-ahead out 
-of-sample forecast for the observation  𝑅 + 1. After that, moving the window one 
period ahead (𝑡 = 2, . . . . . , 𝑅 + 1) to re-estimate the forecasting model for the same 
width. By repeating this step, we can generate one-month-ahead forecast for the 
observation 𝑅 + 1, 𝑅 + 2 and so on. The number of out-of-sample forecasts is equal to 
the total sample size minus the window width ( 𝑃 = T + 1 − R).  
 
Under the null, 𝛽 = 0; Under the alternative, 𝛽 ≠ 0. The one step ahead prediction 
for the null model is a constant value of 0 while 𝛽𝑋𝑡+1
,
 for the alternative model. The 
corresponding sample forest error for the null model and the alternative models are 
?̂?1,𝑡+1 = 𝑦𝑡+1  and ?̂?2,𝑡+1 = 𝑦𝑡+1 − ?̂?𝑡𝑋𝑡+1
,
 respectively. Accordingly, the MSFEs for 
the two models are follows:  
 
MSFE for the model 1: ?̂?1
2 = 𝑝−1 ∑ 𝑦𝑡+1
2𝑇
𝑡=𝑇−𝑃+1    
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MSFE for the alternative model 2: ?̂?2
2 = 𝑝−1 ∑ (𝑦𝑡+1 − ?̂?𝑡𝑋𝑡+1
, )2𝑇𝑡=𝑇−𝑃+1   
 
We are interested in testing whether the MSFE for the model 2 is statistically 
significant less than the MSFE for the model 1, consequently, the null hypothesis and 
the alternative hypothesis read: 
𝐻0: ?̂?1
2 − ?̂?2
2 = 0 
𝐻1: ?̂?1
2 − ?̂?2
2 > 0 
 
The population MSFEs for the two models are equal when 𝐻0 holds. Diebold and 
Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (DMW, hereafter) introduced a technique that can test 
the above null hypothesis, they construct a t-type statistic using sample MSFEs and use 
such statistic to draw the inference. Firstly, defining the following terms:  
𝑓𝑡 = ?̂?1,𝑡
2 − ?̂?2,𝑡
2  
𝑓̅ = 𝑝−1 ∑ 𝑓𝑡+1 =
𝑇
𝑡=𝑇−𝑃+1 ?̂?1
2-?̂?2
2 
?̂? = 𝑝−1 ∑ (𝑓𝑡+1 − 𝑓)̅
2
𝑇
𝑡=𝑇−𝑃+1
 
The DMW test statistic can be constructed as follows: 
DMW =
𝑓̅
√𝑝−1?̂?
 
However, Clark and West (2006) (CW, hereafter) demonstrate that the sample 
difference between the two MSFEs is biased downward from zero. In particular, the 
mean and median of ?̂?1
2 − ?̂?2
2 are negative rather than zero. We use the simple algebra 
to illustrate that the sample difference between two MSFE’s is uncentered:  
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?̂?1
2 − ?̂?2
2 = 𝑝−1 ∑ 𝑓𝑡+1 =
𝑇
𝑡=𝑇−𝑃+1
𝑝−1 ∑ 𝑦𝑡+1
2
𝑇
𝑡=𝑇−𝑃+1
− 𝑝−1 ∑ (𝑦𝑡+1 − ?̂?𝑡𝑋𝑡+1
, )
2
𝑇
𝑡=𝑇−𝑃+1
= 2 {𝑝−1 ∑ 𝑦𝑡+1?̂?𝑡𝑋𝑡+1
,
𝑇
𝑡=𝑇−𝑃+1
} − 𝑝−1 ∑ (?̂?𝑡𝑋𝑡+1
, )
2
𝑇
𝑡=𝑇−𝑃+1
 
 
Under the null, the first term is equal to zero, however, the second term is positive by 
construction. Consequently, under the null, we expect the MSFE for the alternative 
model to be greater than that of the null model. This is due to the fact that the alternative 
model’s MSFE is expected to be pushed upwards by the noise term 
 𝑝−1 ∑ (?̂?𝑡𝑋𝑡+1
, )
2𝑇
𝑡=𝑇−𝑃+1  in finite samples. CW propose a corrected test statistic to 
adjust the shift of DMW statistic. The adjusted statistic suggested by CW is 
asymptotically normally distributed for rolling regressions, and with more desirable 
size and power properties. 
𝑓𝑡+1
𝑎𝑑𝑗
= ?̂?1,𝑡+1
2 − [?̂?2,𝑡+1
2 − (?̂?𝑡𝑋𝑡+1
, )
2
] 
𝑓̅𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 𝑝−1 ∑ 𝑓𝑡+1
𝑎𝑑𝑗
=𝑇𝑡=𝑇−𝑃+1 ?̂?1
2-?̂?2
2+𝑝−1 ∑ (?̂?𝑡𝑋𝑡+1
, )
2𝑇
𝑡=𝑇−𝑃+1  
?̂? = 𝑝−1 ∑ (𝑓𝑡+1
𝑎𝑑𝑗
− 𝑓̅𝑎𝑑𝑗)2
𝑇
𝑡=𝑇−𝑃+1
 
CW =
𝑓̅𝑎𝑑𝑗
√𝑝−1?̂?𝑎𝑑𝑗
 
In our study, we will report the result for both CW and DMW test statistics. 
However, it should be noted that CW test can only test whether the regression 
coefficient is different from zero, it cannot test whether the MSFE from a preferred 
model is smaller than the MSFE from the random walk model since CW test is not a 
minimum MSFE statistic (Rogoff and Stavakeva, 2008). It is possible to reject the null 
model even the MSFE for the alternative model is greater than the MSFE for the random 
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walk model. The significant CW statistic only implies that the exchange rate movement 
can be described by the preferred model. Consequently, we also report the results of 
RMSFE to measure the forecast performance of the preferred model.  
2.5   Empirical Analysis 
As we mentioned above, the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals should mainly 
apply to the inflation targeting countries during the inflation targeting period. Therefore, 
we will investigate the short-term exchange rate predictability before and after the 
adoption of inflation targeting regime. In addition, monetary policy may have changed 
during the recent financial crisis, and therefore we also investigate the predictability 
before and after the financial crisis. 
 
In detail, we divide the full available sample into three sub-periods for comparison 
purpose.  The first sub-period covers the period from the adoption of inflation targeting 
regime but prior to the financial crisis, and we call this period as the conventional 
monetary policy period for the inflation targeting period. The second sub-period covers 
the whole inflation targeting era, and the third sub-period only includes the period after 
the financial crisis, and we call this period as unconventional monetary policy period. 
In addition, it is worth to note that the sample sizes are different across countries due to 
the data availability. The details of available sample size and the sub-periods have been 
reported in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Available sample sizes and  sub-periods definition 
Country 
The full available 
sample 
The conventional 
monetary policy 
period 
The 
unconventional 
monetary policy 
period 
The whole inflation 
targeting period 
Australia 
 
1975 Jan-2018 Mar 
 
1993 Jun-2008 Sep 
 
 
2008 Oct-2018 Mar 
 
 
1993 June-2018 Mar 
 
Canada 
 
1981 Apr-2018 Feb 
 
1991 Feb-2008 Sep 
 
 
2008 Oct-2018 Feb 
 
 
1991 Feb-2018 Feb 
 
Norway 
 
1981 Apr-2018 Mar 
 
2001 Mar-2008 Sep 
 
 
2008 Oct-2018 Mar 
 
 
2001 Mar-2018 Mar 
 
New 
Zealand 
 
1977 Apr-2018 Mar 
 
1990 Feb-2008 Sep 
 
 
2008 Oct-2018 Mar 
 
 
1990 Feb- 2018 Mar 
 
Sweden 
 
1981 Dec-2018 Mar 
 
1993 Jan-2008 Sep 
 
 
2008 Oct-2018 Mar 
 
 
1993 Jan-2018 Mar 
 
UK20 
 
1978 Feb-2017 Jan 
 
1992 Oct-2008 Sep 
 
 
2008 Oct-2017 Jan 
 
 
1992 Oct-2017 Jan 
 
 
2.5.1 Out-of-sample forecasts for the conventional monetary policy period (The 
baseline case) 
We define the period between the introduction of the inflation targeting regime and 
the financial crisis as the baseline case for our analysis. For this part, we set the window 
size equals to half of the total observations during this period. As the starting date for 
adopting inflation target regime varies by country, and therefore the size of the sample, 
rolling window and out-of-sample forecasts vary by country as well.  We report the 
window size for each country in the following table. 
Table 2.2:  The window size for the baseline case  
Country Window size 
Australia 92 
Canada 106 
Norway 45 
New Zealand 112 
Sweden 95 
                                                 
20 The industrial production index data of the UK is not available for the post Jan 2017 period, and 
therefore we can only use data  between Feb 1978 and Jan 2017 for the UK. 
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UK 96 
 
For example, the size of the window for the UK is 96, which illustrate that we have 
96 observations for each rolling regression (the first observation for rolling estimation 
starts in Oct of 1992, see Table 1). As the window size equals to half of the sample, 
then, in turns, there are 96 out-of-sample forecasts to constructing (the first forecast 
starts in 2002 Oct). And the same applies to other countries. For comparison purposes, 
the window size will remain the same for the following sub-periods forecasts unless 
specified. 
 
It is well known that the Global Financial crisis has started in July of 2007. But we 
define the crisis started to affects the Taylor rule model from October of 2008 and 
regard the period before October of 2008 as the panic phase of the financial crisis for 
the monetary authority. There are two reasons behind such setting. Firstly, our 
forecasting model is based on the central bank’s reaction function, but there is no 
evidence of contemporaneous structural change or reaction for the central bank’s policy. 
For instance, the Fed has introduced the zero lower bound for the US in late 2008 
instead of the immediate response. In addition, Molodtsova and Papell (2012) 
demonstrated that The Taylor rule fundamental model with the output gap can provide 
short-term predictability up to the second quarter of 2008, however, the model has lost 
its exchange rate predictability afterwards. 21  Based on the discussions above, we 
suspect our setting of the unconventional monetary policy periods to capture the policy 
shift of the financial crisis is plausible.  
                                                 
21 Molodtsova and Papell (2012) have investigated the Taylor rules exchange rate model during the 
crisis period. The evidence suggests that the Taylor rule fundamental can only produce short term 
predictability from 2007Q1 to 2008Q2.  For the period after 2008Q2, the results are in favour of random 
walk. 
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Table 2.3-2.6 report the one-month-ahead forecasts of the exchange rate for the 
conventional monetary policy period. As we mentioned above, there is no consensus 
for whether central bank targets the exchange rate and has interest rate smoothing 
behaviour, we estimate each type Taylor rule fundamentals with four specifications, 
namely, with and without targeting real exchange rate, and with and without interest 
rate smoothing. For example, the term asymmetric Taylor rule model with no 
smoothing (Table 2.3) refers to central bank targets the real exchange rate but does not 
have interest rate smoothing. The first and the second column report the CW and DMW 
p-values, and the third column presents the ratio of MSFE of the preferred model 
relative to that of the random walk model. The left panel depicts the results of the 
standard Taylor rule fundamentals while the right panel depicts the results of the 
augmented Taylor rule fundamentals. 
 
For the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals, the model outperforms the random 
walk for 13 out of 24 cases. We can find short-term predictability at least for 3 countries 
regardless of the specifications. The strongest results are found in the symmetric model 
with smoothing, where 2 out of 6 countries outperforms the random walk at 1% 
significance levels (New Zealand and Sweden) with the RMSFEs for all the significant 
cases are smaller than unity. 
 
The standard Taylor rule fundamentals provide similar results with the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals, but with only 10 significant CW statistics that are able to 
reject the no predictability null and none of them at 1 percent significance levels. The 
asymmetric Taylor rule model with no smoothing is the least powerful specification 
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where only 1 out of 6 countries outperforms the random walk model, while the 
symmetric Taylor rule model with smoothing again provides the strongest results.  
 
Combing the four different specifications for both models, there is no short-term 
predictability for Norway. We suspect this is because Norway only introduces the 
inflation targeting regime in the early 2000s. Such a short period may lead to less 
powerful results. For New Zealand and Sweden, the exchange rate predictability 
increases when we use the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals as the CW statistics are 
significant for all the specifications. However, the UK results show the opposite as we 
found 2 significant CW statistics for standard Taylor rule but only 1 significant CW 
statistic for augmented Taylor rule fundamentals. The performances for Australia are 
similar for both models as we only found exchange rate predictability in symmetric 
Taylor rule model with smoothing. Canada is the most contradicted case between these 
two models. For the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals, evidence of short-term 
predictability is found for three specifications with two cases at the 1% significance 
levels. On the other hand, we can only find one significant CW statistic for the standard 
Taylor rule fundamentals. 
 
Overall, we find that the number of significant CW statistics for augmented Taylor 
rule fundamentals exceeds the standard Taylor rule fundamentals (13 versus 10). In 
addition, there are 16 cases with RMSFE smaller than unity for the augmented Taylor 
rule fundamentals compared with only 10 cases for the standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals. Hence, the assumption of asymmetric monetary preferences is important 
for using Taylor rule exchange rate forecasting model as augmented Taylor rule 
 80 
 
fundamentals can provide strong short-term predictability for the inflation targeting 
countries during the conventional monetary policy period. 
 
Table 2.3: Asymmetric Taylor rule model with no smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.14 0.48 0.980 0.16 0.49 0.993 
Canada 0.48 0.53 1.037 0.07* 0.51 1.007 
Norway 0.45 0.56 1.035 0.74 0.59 1.184 
New Zealand 0.15 0.51 1.007 0.05* 0.49 0.998 
Sweden 0.03** 0.48 0.986 0.06* 0.47 0.941 
UK 0.12 0.50 1.000 0.14 0.50 1.003 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
Table 2.4: Symmetric Taylor rule model with no smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.11 0.46 0.961 0.12 0.47 0.973 
Canada 0.40 0.52 1.010 0.00*** 0.41 0.954 
Norway 0.26 0.52 1.010 0.68 0.57 1.159 
New Zealand 0.05* 0.48 0.991 0.02** 0.47 0.977 
Sweden 0.02** 0.48 0.998 0.05* 0.47 0.943 
UK 0.07* 0.46 0.961 0.12 0.48 0.976 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
Table 2.5: Asymmetric Taylor rule model with smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.13 0.48 0.965 0.14 0.51 1.019 
Canada 0.02** 0.56 1.054 0.14 0.54 1.025 
Norway 0.76 0.63 1.159 0.85 0.64 1.408 
New Zealand 0.03** 0.50 1.003 0.02** 0.50 0.994 
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Sweden 0.12 0.53 1.035 0.04** 0.47 0.946 
UK 0.10 0.55 1.168 0.08* 0.50 0.990 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
Table 2.6: Symmetric Taylor rule model with smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.07* 0.48 0.976 0.09* 0.49 0.993 
Canada 0.13 0.50 1.003 0.00*** 0.46 0.969 
Norway 0.62 0.62 1.155 0.83 0.64 1.388 
New Zealand 0.03** 0.49 1.001 0.00*** 0.51 0.986 
Sweden 0.01** 0.49 0.997 0.03** 0.46 0.936 
UK 0.06* 0.47 0.965 0.11 0.49 0.988 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative model. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
2.5.2 Out-of-sample forecasts for the whole inflation targeting period 
In this part, we extend the sample which covers the whole inflation targeting period. 
Table 2.7-2.10 report the one-month-ahead out-of-sample forecasts of the exchange rate 
for this period. The window size is the same as the baseline case, but the forecasting 
period extends from 2008Q3 to the most recent available point. 
 
The results of augmented Taylor rule fundamentals are not successful for the whole 
inflation targeting period. There is a significant decrease in short-term predictability as 
the number of significant CW statistics have dropped from 13 to 8, and with all 
RMSFEs greater than unity. Although we can find short-term predictability for Norway, 
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the predictability is disappeared for Australia and the UK. Overall, there is only limited 
evidence of exchange rate predictability for the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals. 
 
On the other hand, the standard Taylor rule fundamentals provide even stronger 
predictability as the number of significant CW statistics has increased from 10 to 20 
and the short-term predictability is found for all the countries. However, the RMSFEs 
are all greater than unity except for the UK in the case of symmetric Taylor rule model 
with no smoothing.  
 
Furthermore, the symmetric Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing again provides 
the strongest evidence of predictability. For the standard Taylor rule fundamentals, we 
find predictability for all the countries. The same also holds for the augmented Taylor 
rule fundamentals as the exchange rate predictability are found for 3 out of 6 countries, 
which exceeds the other specifications. 
 
However, the strong evidence of exchange rate predictability for standard Taylor 
rule is questionable. Based on our forecasting equation settings, one of important 
assumptions is the central bank should follow Taylor rule. As we mentioned in the 
previous section, after the financial crisis and followed by near-zero interest rates for 
the US, UK and other central banks, the advantages of the Taylor rule were bleak since 
we cannot regard the short-term interest rate as the main policy instrument. That is to 
say, the Taylor rule is not sufficient to capture the central bank’s interest rate setting 
behaviour during the unconventional monetary policy period. Hence, from the 
theoretical side, using the standard Taylor rule to forecasting the exchange rate should 
lose its power if the unconventional monetary policy period is included. It is clear that 
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the standard Taylor rule fundamentals does not take into account the monetary policy 
shift in 2008, the implications of such strong exchange rate predictability are not clear. 
 
 There are two potential reasons for such strong performance of the standard Taylor 
rule. Firstly, the standard Taylor rule is regarded to be a good description of how central 
bank conducts its monetary policy in the past thirty years. And therefore, the larger the 
data sample is, the more forecasts can be characterised as standard Taylor rule. 
Secondly, the standard Taylor rule fundamentals shows the exchange rate can be 
determined by the output gap and inflation rate through the monetary policy channel. 
Our previous analysis shows that the monetary policy channel may be questionable 
during the unconventionally monetary policy period, but it does not rule out that there 
are other channels could link the exchange rate with the output gap and inflation rate. 
In addition, although the standard Taylor rule fundamentals can provide superior 
predictability results relative to the random walk model, with only 1 case for RMSFE 
less than unity and none of them are at 1 percent significance levels for all the 
significant CW statistics, we infer that such strong exchange rate predictability is not 
robust. 
Table 2.7: Asymmetric Taylor rule model with no smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.06* 0.53 1.035 0.23 0.55 1.071 
Canada 0.45 0.60 1.078 0.60 0.57 1.090 
Norway 0.01** 0.51 1.019 0.04** 0.54 1.073 
New Zealand 0.11 0.53 1.030 0.13 0.53 1.050 
Sweden 0.05* 0.52 1.026 0.19 0.52 1.062 
UK 0.04** 0.53 1.024 0.19 0.55 1.063 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
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to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
Table 2.8: Symmetric Taylor rule model with no smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.04** 0.52 1.024 0.19 0.55 1.064 
Canada 0.32 0.54 1.041 0.54 0.46 1.044 
Norway 0.01** 0.51 1.009 0.04** 0.53 1.058 
New Zealand 0.08** 0.52 1.022 0.09* 0.52 1.034 
Sweden 0.06* 0.52 1.029 0.18 0.52 1.065 
UK 0.06* 0.50 0.998 0.15 0.52 1.023 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
 
Table 2.9: Asymmetric Taylor rule model with smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.04** 0.53 1.059 0.10 0.56 1.104 
Canada 0.01** 0.56 1.075 0.28 0.57 1.073 
Norway 0.03** 0.54 1.128 0.06* 0.56 1.174 
New Zealand 0.01** 0.54 1.060 0.01** 0.52 1.045 
Sweden 0.23 0.56 1.091 0.18 0.53 1.095 
UK 0.05* 0.56 1.176 0.11 0.55 1.072 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
 
Table 2.10: Symmetric Taylor rule model with smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.04** 0.53 1.056 0.10 0.56 1.094 
Canada 0.04** 0.53 1.031 0.06** 0.53 1.035 
Norway 0.02** 0.54 1.106 0.05* 0.56 1.161 
New Zealand 0.01** 0.52 1.032 0.01** 0.52 1.040 
Sweden 0.04** 0.54 1.055 0.13 0.53 1.074 
UK 0.06* 0.52 1.039 0.12 0.54 1.055 
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Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
2.5.3 Out-of-sample forecasts for the unconventional monetary policy period 
In this part, we present the results for one month-ahead out-of-sample forecasts of 
the exchange rates for the unconventional monetary policy period only. Due to the fact 
that the sample size for this period is relatively short, we cannot keep the same window 
size. For instance, the total observations for New Zealand during the unconventional 
monetary policy period is 114, and if we keep the same window size as the baseline 
case -112, we only have 2 forecasts. Due to this reason, the window size for this section 
is equal to half of the total observations in the unconventional monetary policy period. 
Table 2.11 reports the detailed window size for each country. It is worth to note that the 
rolling regressions only represent the historical relationship between the Taylor rule 
fundamentals and the exchange rate for the post-unconventional monetary policy period. 
And the model does not use the pre-unconventional monetary policy period’s 
information to forecast the exchange rate.  
Table 2.11: The window size for the unconventional 
monetary policy period 
Country Window size 
Australia 57 
Canada 56 
Norway 57 
New Zealand 57 
Sweden 57 
UK 50 
 
Compared with the previous two sub-periods estimations, the unconventional 
monetary policy period provides the weakest short-term predictability for both models 
(see Table 2.12-2.15). There are only 5 cases that we can reject the no predictability 
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null by CW statistics for both models, and with only one case for RMSFE smaller than 
unity. Overall, there are only three countries with short-term predictability for both 
models. This should not be surprising since the Taylor rule model does not have enough 
features to capture the central bank’s interest rate setting behaviour during the 
unconventional monetary policy period. 
 
And, it is interesting to note that both models generate almost exactly the same 
results. Although there is a slight difference for the significance levels, we find that the 
countries with short-term predictability are identical for both models across different 
specifications. This situation reflects the fact that the central bank’s monetary 
preference to inflation and output gap (either symmetric or asymmetric) becomes a less 
relevant component to describe the exchange rate movement during the unconventional 
monetary policy period, and suggesting there are other variables or behaviours affect 
the interest rate reaction function. 
 
 Furthermore, the symmetric Taylor rule model with no smoothing once again 
provide the strongest predictability as there are 2 countries with short-term 
predictability, and there is only one significant CW statistic for other three 
specifications. 
Table 2.12: Asymmetric Taylor rule model with no smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.51 0.57 1.064 0.29 0.58 1.105 
Canada 0.69 0.58 1.104 0.53 0.57 1.110 
Norway 0.74 0.62 1.112 0.77 0.64 1.147 
New Zealand 0.41 0.56 1.048 0.83 0.61 1.223 
Sweden 0.03** 0.50 1.004 0.03** 0.52 1.045 
UK 0.14 0.53 1.032 0.23 0.56 1.060 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
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without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift 
 
 
Table 2.13: Symmetric Taylor rule model with no smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.82 0.61 1.103 0.88 0.65 1.146 
Canada 0.93 0.61 1.081 0.90 0.61 1.082 
Norway 0.93 0.62 1.066 0.97 0.65 1.125 
New Zealand 0.86 0.60 1.068 0.90 0.61 1.186 
Sweden 0.16 0.53 1.040 0.14 0.55 1.077 
UK 0.06* 0.51 1.006 0.09* 0.54 1.025 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
Table 2.14: Asymmetric Taylor rule model with smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.51 0.65 1.588 0.30 0.57 1.109 
Canada 0.83 0.63 1.311 0.67 0.62 1.198 
Norway 0.25 0.57 1.191 0.28 0.57 1.127 
New Zealand 0.55 0.64 1.386 0.22 0.59 1.172 
Sweden 0.05* 0.55 1.092 0.07* 0.55 1.094 
UK 0.64 0.66 1.638 0.19 0.59 1.170 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
Table 2.15: Symmetric Taylor rule model with smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.29 0.56 1.098 0.65 0.61 1.187 
Canada 0.35 0.57 1.089 0.34 0.58 1.142 
Norway 0.12 0.52 1.043 0.21 0.55 1.095 
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New Zealand 0.02** 0.50 1.000 0.04** 0.53 1.055 
Sweden 0.01** 0.5 0.995 0.05* 0.54 1.081 
UK 0.19 0.6 1.132 0.36 0.62 1.167 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
2.5.4 Out-of-sample forecasts for the full available sample 
In this part, we perform the Taylor rule forecasting for the full available sample. 
Although we made an inference that the augmented forecasting model should mainly 
apply to the normal monetary policy period, it does not mean that there are no 
asymmetric preferences before the inflation targeting period. Indeed, there is some 
empirical evidence of asymmetric preference prior to the inflation targeting regime. For 
instance, Baxa et al. (2014) illustrate that the response of interest rates to positive 
inflation gap is particularly high for the BoE in early 1980. Hence, investigating the full 
sample is also crucial for the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals. Table 2.16-2.19 
report the one-month-ahead out-of-sample forecasts of the exchange rate for the full 
sample. 
 
It should be noted that the window size is the same as the baseline case (see Table 
2.2). Overall, the standard Taylor rule fundamentals can provide more evidence of 
short-term predictability for the inflation targeting countries as there are 10 more 
significant CW statistics compared with the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals (18 
versus 8). 
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It is clear that the results of augmented Taylor rule fundamentals are not as 
successful as the baseline case. But, the short-term predictability has increased 
compared with the results for the unconventional monetary policy period. The results 
for the full sample period are similar to the whole inflation targeting period. In 
particular, there are 8 significant CW statistics which can reject the no predictability 
null for both periods. In addition, the short-term predictability is founded in Canada, 
New Zealand, and Norway for both sub-periods. The full sample can provide an 
additional country with short-term predictability (Australia) in the case of symmetric 
Taylor rule model with smoothing, but only at 10 percent significance levels. 
 
The standard Taylor rule fundamentals has maintained its power of predictability 
when we extend the sample to the pre-inflation targeting period. Apart from the 
unconventional monetary policy period, the length of the sample does not have strong 
impacts on the short-term predictability as the number of significant CW statistics are 
relatively stable compared with the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals. The 
performances of the standard Taylor rule fundamentals for the full sample period are 
also similar with the whole inflation targeting period, especially for the specification of 
symmetric Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing as there are short-term exchange 
rate predictability for all the inflation targeting countries.22  
Table 2.16: Asymmetric Taylor rule model with no smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.10 0.53 1.037 0.34 0.55 1.070 
Canada 0.31 0.54 1.065 0.39 0.55 1.077 
Norway 0.01** 0.54 1.056 0.35 0.52 1.536 
                                                 
22 Furthermore, we also report the results of the full available sample by using the same window size 
as the M&P (see Appendix 4). Our full available sample covers a similar period with the data sample of 
M&P. Therefore, we can evaluate whether the exchange rate predictability is consistent under the 
different window sizes. Overall, our full sample results are robust under different window sizes. 
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New Zealand 0.06* 0.53 1.021 0.11 0.54 1.038 
Sweden 0.14 0.54 1.044 0.25 0.53 1.073 
UK 0.08* 0.54 1.048 0.17 0.55 1.071 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
 
Table 2.17:  Symmetric Taylor rule model with no smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.03** 0.52 1.022 0.13 0.54 1.052 
Canada 0.19 0.54 1.036 0.14 0.53 1.043 
Norway 0.01** 0.53 1.050 0.36 0.52 1.534 
New Zealand 0.04** 0.53 1.016 0.06* 0.52 1.021 
Sweden 0.07* 0.53 1.029 0.10 0.53 1.061 
UK 0.16 0.53 1.036 0.25 0.55 1.051 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
Table 2.18: Asymmetric Taylor rule model with smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.02** 0.55 1.093 0.16 0.56 1.095 
Canada 0.00*** 0.58 1.131 0.09** 0.55 1.060 
Norway 0.01** 0.58 1.216 0.05* 0.54 1.303 
New Zealand 0.02** 0.53 1.022 0.01** 0.53 1.029 
Sweden 0.11 0.55 1.094 0.24 0.55 1.116 
UK 0.08* 0.57 1.167 0.27 0.55 1.103 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
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Table 2.19: Symmetric Taylor rule model with smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.03** 0.53 1.044 0.08* 0.55 1.074 
Canada 0.03** 0.53 1.030 0.02** 0.53 1.036 
Norway 0.00*** 0.55 1.113 0.04** 0.54 1.267 
New Zealand 0.01** 0.51 1.002 0.00*** 0.52 1.014 
Sweden 0.05* 0.54 1.069 0.13 0.53 1.085 
UK 0.07* 0.54 1.072 0.20 0.55 1.091 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
2.5.6 Out-of-sample forecasts for the interest rate fundamentals  
Table 2.20 reports the results for one-month-ahead forecasts of exchange rate using 
the interest rate fundamentals. Compared with standard Taylor rule fundamentals and 
augmented Taylor rule fundamentals, the evidence of predictability is much weaker.  It 
is clear that we do not find short-term exchange rate predictability for the conventional 
monetary policy period and the whole inflation targeting period. In terms of the 
unconventional monetary policy period, there is only one case where the interest rate 
fundamentals significantly outperforms the random walk (New Zealand at the 5% 
significance level). However, the exchange predictability increase when we use the full 
available sample, the interest rate fundamentals significantly outperforms the random 
walk for 3 out of 6 countries (Canada at and Norway at 10% significance level, New 
Zealand at 10% significance level) but the RMSFEs for all three cases are greater than 
zero.  
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Table 2.20: One-month-ahead out-of-sample forecasts for the interest rate 
fundamentals 
Panel A: The conventional monetary policy period 
Country CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.23 0.52 1.013 
Canada 0.38 0.51 1.005 
Norway 0.37 0.55 1.040 
New Zealand 0.35 0.51 1.011 
Sweden 0.29 0.52 1.012 
UK 0.54 0.53 1.022 
Panel B: The whole inflation targeting period 
Country CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.28 0.52 1.013 
Canada 0.13 0.50 0.999 
Norway 0.14 0.53 1.026 
New Zealand 0.11 0.53 1.021 
Sweden 0.22 0.52 1.010 
UK 0.90 0.56 1.034 
Panel C: The unconventional monetary policy period 
Country CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.26 0.53 1.029 
Canada 0.61 0.54 1.027 
Norway 0.10 0.50 0.999 
New Zealand 0.02** 0.50 0.998 
Sweden 0.22 0.53 1.036 
UK 0.17 0.55 1.058 
Panel D : The full available sample 
Country CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.16 0.51 1.011 
Canada 0.06* 0.50 1.000 
Norway 0.07* 0.54 1.032 
New Zealand 0.04** 0.53 1.003 
Sweden 0.40 0.53 1.011 
UK 0.48 0.54 1.038 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the interest rate differentials fundamentals is the alternative 
model. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model significantly outperforms the random walk 
model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root 
mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative to that of the random walk without drift, the 
values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better than the random walk without drift. 
 
 
2.5.7 Summary of the results  
To sum up, we evaluate the out-of-sample exchange rate forecasting performances 
for standard Taylor rule fundamentals, augmented Taylor rule fundamentals and 
interest rate fundamentals. For the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals, we find 
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relatively strong evidence of exchange rate predictability during the conventional 
monetary period, and the exchange rate predictability of the augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals is more robust than that of the standard Taylor rule fundamentals. 
Consequently, incorporating the central bank’s asymmetric preference into the interest 
reaction function and modelling the exchange rate movement under the assumption of 
asymmetric exchange rate responses are important for the conventional monetary 
policy period. In addition, out-of-sample exchange rate predictability for the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals decrease if we include the pre-inflation targeting period or the 
unconventional monetary policy period, which illustrate that the asymmetric monetary 
preference and the subsequent asymmetric exchange rate responses become less 
relevant during the pre-inflation targeting period and the unconventional monetary 
policy period. On the other hand, the out-of-sample exchange rate predictability for 
standard Taylor rule fundamentals does not decrease if we include the pre-inflation 
targeting period, the change of the monetary policy has less impacts on the exchange 
rate predictability for the standard Taylor rule fundamentals. According to the results 
for the whole inflation targeting period, the exchange rate predictability for standard 
Taylor rule fundamentals has survived during the unconventional monetary policy 
period, which is in line with the Ince et al. (2016) findings. However, one thing to note 
that is such predictability also use the historical relationship between Taylor rule 
fundamentals and the exchange rates prior to the unconventional monetary policy 
period. Once we exclude such historical relationship, the short-term predictability falls 
apart during the unconventional monetary policy period.  
 
In addition, the baseline analysis (the conventional monetary policy period) 
provides the most interpretable results as the results for RMSFE are consistent with the 
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CW statistics.  For the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals, the null hypothesis was 
rejected at the 10 percent level or higher for most of the cases where the RMSFE was 
less than one. For the standard Taylor rule fundamentals, there are 7 cases where the 
RMSFEs are less than unity and the random walk null are rejected.  
 
However, the situations are different for the other estimation periods, there are only 
2 cases where the RMSFEs are less than unity and the random walk null are rejected 
(see Table 2.21 for detail). For our previous analysis, we rely on a less severe metric 
and say that we find evidence in favour of the preferred model if CW statistic is 
significant at 10 percent level (or higher). However, if we use a more strict metric, and 
say that the evidence of predictability can only be confirmed when both RMSFE is less 
than one and the CW statistic is significant at the 10 percent level (or higher), then we 
obtain a different conclusion. By using such metric, the evidence of exchange rate 
predictability for both types of Taylor rule fundamentals fall apart, except for the 
conventional monetary policy period. Consequently, we suspect the evidence that in 
favour of the Taylor rule fundamentals are robust for the conventional monetary policy 
period only.  
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Table 2.21: Summary Table  
Model Significant 
CW statistics 
RMSFE 
smaller than 
unity 
Country with evidence of 
short-term predictability at 
5% significance levels or 
higher 
A: The conventional monetary policy period 
Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
10 10 Canada, New Zealand, 
Sweden 
Augmented Taylor 
rule fundamentals 
13 16 Canada, New Zealand, 
Sweden 
B: The whole Inflation targeting period 
Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
20 1 Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
UK 
Augmented Taylor 
rule fundamentals 
8 0 Canada, New Zealand, 
Norway 
C: The unconventional monetary policy period 
Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
5 1 New Zealand ,Sweden,  
Augmented Taylor 
rule fundamentals 
5 0 New Zealand, Sweden 
D: The full  available sample 
Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
18 0 Australia, Canada, 
Norway, New Zealand 
Augmented Taylor 
rule fundamentals 
8 0 Canada, New Zealand, 
Norway 
 
 
The inconsistency between RMSFE and CW statistics are also mentioned in Rogoff 
and Stavrakeva (2008), by replicating M&P’s results, although there are 10 out 12 
countries with short-term predictability by using CW statistics, only 1 out of them has 
RMSFE less than unity. This issue arises because the CW test can only test whether the 
coefficient 𝛽 is significantly different from zero, but it cannot test whether the MSFE 
for the preferred model is smaller than the MSFE for the random walk model. Therefore, 
the significant CW test only implies that the exchange rate movement can be better 
described by the preferred model. However, such inconsistence beyond the scope of 
this paper, and there is no econometric tool can investigate the discrepancy currently. 
We leave this point as further research. 
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2.5.8 Forecast coefficients 
In previous sections, it is clear that the model with augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals provides strong evidence of exchange rate predictability during the 
inflation target period but prior to the financial crisis (conventional monetary policy 
period).  The interesting questions to explore are whether the pattern of the estimated 
coefficients for the asymmetric exchange rate responses are different for each sub-
sample period, and whether the estimated coefficients are more significant for the 
conventional monetary policy period. 
 
Consequently, we plot the dynamics of the coefficients on the squared term based 
on the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals. As the most successful specification for 
our empirical results is the symmetric Taylor rule model with smoothing, we only show 
the coefficient for this specification. Since the data availability and the rolling window 
size vary by country, the start date of the plots vary by country as well. For example, 
the data availability for Australia starts in 1975 Jan and the window size is 92 
forecasting, therefore the plot starts in Sep 1982 when the first prediction is made. The 
same logic applies to the rest of the countries. Generally speaking, the asymmetric 
exchange rate response to the inflation gap can be neglected before the inflation 
targeting period, as the estimated coefficients are extremely close to zero for all the 
countries.  
 
In addition, for 4 out of 6 countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK), 
the patterns are similar. The coefficients on the squared inflation gap near zero before 
the end of the 1990s (or the early 2000s). As the estimation window move forward 
during the inflation targeting period and more data is characterised by the augmented 
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Taylor rule fundamentals, the coefficients start to affect the exchange rate movement 
and become positive around 2000. However, such positive coefficients approach to zero 
again during the unconventional monetary policy period. Here, we use yellow area chart 
to highlight the coefficients from the data of the conventional monetary policy. As we 
can see from the figure 1.1,  for those four countries, it is clear that the patterns of the 
coefficients to the squared inflation gap are different for each sub-sample periods-
before the introduction of the inflation targeting, the conventional monetary policy 
period and the unconventional monetary policy period, which are consistent with our 
presumption that the asymmetric monetary preference are more significant for 
exchange rate forecasting during the conventional monetary policy period. In addition, 
the pattern of the coefficients during the conventional monetary policy period suggest 
that the forecasted appreciation caused by the inflation rate above its target is higher 
than the forecasted depreciation caused by the inflation rate below its target during the 
conventional monetary policy period. On the other hand, the pattern of Norway and 
Sweden are not clear as the coefficients are near zero for most of the forecasts, which 
suggest there is less evidence of the asymmetric exchange rate responses to the inflation 
gap.   
Figure 1.1:  The dynamics of the coefficient on the squared inflation gap  
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Compared with figure 1.1, the dynamics of the estimated coefficients on the output 
gap (Figure 1.2) are less precise. For figure 1.2, the yellow area chart also represents 
the estimated coefficients from the data of the conventional monetary policy period. 
Overall, Sweden is the only country has clear three different patterns, which correspond 
to each monetary policy shift. 
 
The asymmetric exchange rate responses to output appeared even before the 
introduction of inflation targeting regime for Canada and the UK. We found that the 
coefficients are continuously positive for New Zealand and the UK during the 
conventional monetary policy period, however, the coefficients remain positive for 
New Zealand after the financial crisis while approach to zero for the UK. The 
coefficients for Canada are negative throughout the whole inflation targeting period, 
which suggest the Canadian dollar react more aggressively when the negative output 
gap occurs. In addition, For Australia, the estimates are not clear as there is no clear 
pattern for each sub-sample period and the estimated coefficients are near zero 
throughout the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
9
8
6
 F
E
B
1
9
8
6
 D
E
C
1
9
8
7
 O
C
T
1
9
8
8
 A
U
G
1
9
8
9
 J
U
N
1
9
9
0
 A
P
R
1
9
9
1
 F
E
B
1
9
9
1
 D
E
C
1
9
9
2
 O
C
T
1
9
9
3
 A
U
G
1
9
9
4
 J
U
N
1
9
9
5
 A
P
R
1
9
9
6
 F
E
B
1
9
9
6
 D
E
C
1
9
9
7
 O
C
T
1
9
9
8
 A
U
G
1
9
9
9
 J
U
N
2
0
0
0
 A
P
R
2
0
0
1
 F
E
B
2
0
0
1
 D
E
C
2
0
0
2
 O
C
T
2
0
0
3
 A
U
G
2
0
0
4
 J
U
N
2
0
0
5
 A
P
R
2
0
0
6
 F
E
B
2
0
0
6
 D
E
C
2
0
0
7
 O
C
T
2
0
0
8
 A
U
G
2
0
0
9
 J
U
N
2
0
1
0
 A
P
R
2
0
1
1
 F
E
B
2
0
1
1
 D
E
C
2
0
1
2
 O
C
T
2
0
1
3
 A
U
G
2
0
1
4
 J
U
N
2
0
1
5
 A
P
R
2
0
1
6
 F
E
B
2
0
1
6
 D
E
C
UK
 100 
 
Figure1.2: The dynamics of the coefficient on the squared output gap  
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2.6   Conclusion 
Past literature has shown strong evidence of out-of-sample exchange rate 
predictability for Taylor rule fundamentals. Such strong evidence are mainly due to the 
fact that the Taylor rule has achieved great success for describing the monetary policy 
during the last two decades. When the monetary policy and exchange rate are strongly 
related, the exchange rate should be determined by the fundamentals in the Taylor rule 
rather than the traditional macroeconomic fundamentals. However, the Taylor rule only 
assumes that the central bank responds evenly to the positive and negative deviations 
of inflation and output gap from the target values. This setting is not consistent with the 
fact that some credible central banks have asymmetric interventions to those deviations. 
Therefore, the Taylor rule based exchange rate model cannot reflect the asymmetric 
monetary preferences and the potential asymmetric exchange rate responses caused by 
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the asymmetric monetary preferences. Hence, we derived an augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals, which is able to capture the asymmetric monetary preferences and the 
subsequent asymmetric exchange rate responses. Prior to the estimates, we suspect the 
augmented Taylor rule fundamentals should more suitable for inflation targeting 
country during the conventional monetary policy period but will lose its explanatory 
power for the unconventional monetary policy period and the pre-inflation targeting 
period.   
 
In order to test this hypothesis, we use four sub-sample periods, the full available 
sample, the whole inflation targeting period, the conventional monetary policy period, 
and the unconventional monetary policy period. Our results confirm this presumption, 
indeed, the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals can generate relatively stronger 
evidence of out-of-sample exchange rate predictability than the standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals during the conventional monetary policy period, and such strong 
evidence is robust.  However, the role of asymmetric exchange rate responses become 
less relevant when we included the pre-inflation targeting period or the unconventional 
monetary policy period. In addition, the structural change of the monetary policy does 
not have strong effects on short-term exchange rate predictability for the standard 
Taylor rule fundamentals as the evidence of short-term exchange rate predictability is 
relatively stable compared with the augmented Taylor rule.  
 
Furthermore, there is a clear inconsistency between the CW statistic and RMSFE. 
Apart from the conventional monetary policy period, there are only two cases where 
the RMSFEs are less than unity and the random walk null are rejected. This issue arises 
because the null hypothesis for these two statistics are different. Molodtsova et al. (2010) 
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argue that the CW statistic is a test for whether the exchange rate is a random walk, and 
the significant CW statistic only implies exchange rate predictability rather than 
forecast ability.  However, this augment is subject to Rogoff and criticism, they state 
that “if the true model is something other than a random walk, one can still perfectly 
well ask if the random walk model produces a lower MSFE.”  In order to address this 
criticism, we use a strict metric to evaluating the exchange rate predictability that the 
random walk null can only be rejected when the RMSFE is less than one and the CW 
statistic is significant. By using the strict metric, we found the exchange rate 
predictability of standard Taylor rule fundamentals also fall apart when we included the 
pre-inflation targeting period or the unconventional monetary policy period, and the 
evidence of exchange rate predictability is only robust for the conventional monetary 
policy period.  
 
This paper suggests a number of directions for future research. First, our empirical 
analysis is based on revised data. This is due to the fact that the real-time data is not 
available for all the inflation targeting countries. However, the real-time data is 
available for the UK and US, and therefore the future research could evaluate the 
augmented Taylor rule fundamentals with real-time data for the dollar/pound exchange 
rate. In addition, the theoretical framework of A&P suggests that the asymmetric 
monetary preference, and the subsequent asymmetric exchange rate response mainly 
applies to a county with credible inflation targeting regime. For this study, we only 
recognise a country who formally adopt the inflation targeting regime as a credible 
inflation targeting regime. However, other central banks such as ECB also implement 
an inflation stabilisation objective. Hence, we could relax the assumption of a credible 
inflation targeting regime and expand the sample to the country who does not formally 
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adopt the inflation targeting regime but has a clear inflation stabilisation objective. 
Furthermore, the augmented Taylor rule fundamentals assumes that the central bank 
follows a nonlinear Taylor rule. However, our empirical analysis does not use the 
estimated coefficients from the nonlinear Taylor rule, and it is still unclear that whether 
the evidence of exchange rate predictability is related to central bank follows a 
nonlinear Taylor rule. Therefore, the assumption of the augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals lacks empirical support, which can be regarded as the main limitation of 
this chapter. 
Concluding Remarks 
     In contrast with existing literature, this thesis investigates the effects of asymmetric 
monetary preference within an open economy framework. The main findings can be 
summarised as follows. Firstly, under an open economy framework, we find that the 
BoE has recession avoidance in which the policymakers react more aggressively to 
output contractions than to the output expansions. The asymmetric policy responses 
reflect that the BoE is more averse to negative than to positive output gaps of equal size. 
This finding is differential from the conventional view that the BoE may be more 
concerned about the inflation rate exceeds its target rate during periods of inflation 
stabilisation. 
   
  Secondly, we suspect that the asymmetric monetary preference is the main cause 
of the reported asymmetries in exchange rate responses. Consequently, we derive an 
augmented Taylor rule fundamentals for the exchange rate in chapter 2, in which the 
exchange rate respond not only to the level of inflation and output gaps as suggested by 
standard Taylor rule fundamentals but also to their squared values.  We test the out-of-
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sample exchange rate predictability using augmented Taylor rule fundamentals for 6 
inflation targeting countries. Our empirical results suggest that the augmented Taylor 
rule fundamentals can better capture the dynamics of the exchange rate than the 
standard Taylor rule fundamental during the conventional monetary period. To the best 
of my knowledge, chapter 2 is the first empirical study in the literature to link the 
asymmetric exchange rate responses with the exchange rate predictability. 
 
In addition, findings from both chapters support the view that policy function and 
the asymmetry properties change in line with the regime and the main macroeconomic 
problem of the day. In particular, the empirical evidence confirms that our theoretical 
framework mainly applies to the conventional monetary policy period, and it is not 
adequate to capture the dynamics of interest rate and exchange rate during the 
unconventional monetary policy period due to the monetary policy shift. It is clear that 
the evidence of asymmetries in monetary policy preference and the subsequent 
asymmetries in exchange rate responses are much weak after the financial crisis. Indeed, 
a number of studies argue that the Taylor rule without consideration of financial 
conditions could not explain the aggressive monetary policy of central banks from early 
2008 (see, Meyer, 2008, Mishkin, 2008). Consequently, a possible way to address the 
weak evidence of asymmetry after the financial crisis is to include the indicators of 
financial stress in the optimal monetary policy rule and the augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals. Furthermore, our theoretical frameworks mainly apply to a credible 
inflation targeting monetary policy. However, several central banks in developing 
countries also achieve policy credibility in anchoring inflation expectations. As a result, 
it would be fruitful to examine our research questions for developing countries. These 
can be taken as future research. 
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Appendix 1 The derivation of the first order condition for A&P 2016 
 
IS equation: 
𝑦𝑡 = −𝜙[𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ] + 𝜃𝑆𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡+1
𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡               (1.1) 
Phillips equation: 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜆𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 + 𝜂𝑡                                        (1.2) 
UIRP condition: 
(1 + 𝑖𝑡) =
𝑠𝑡+1
𝑒
𝑠𝑡
(1 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑓)                                        (1.3) 
Following Surico (2007), the monetary authority chooses the interest rate that 
minimizes the loss function, L: 
𝐿 =
𝑒𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗)−𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗)−1
𝛼2
+ 𝛿(
𝑒𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝛾𝑦𝑡−1
𝛾2
) +
𝜇
2
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖
∗)2              (1.4) 
The monetary authority minimizes 𝐿 in (1.4) subject to (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3). In order 
to get the first order condition, we rewrite the equation (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) as follows: 
 
IS equation: 𝑦𝑡 = −𝜙[𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ] + 𝜃𝑆𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡, where 𝑔𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡+1
𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡        (1.5) 
Phillips equation: 𝜋𝑡 = 𝜆𝑦𝑡 + 𝑓𝑡, where 𝑓𝑡 = 𝛽𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 + 𝜂𝑡                          (1.6) 
Interest rate parity:  𝑠𝑡 =
𝐴
1+𝑖𝑡
, where 𝐴 = 𝑆𝑡+1
𝑒 (1 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑓)                             (1.7) 
 
Then, substituting (1.5) and (1.6) into the loss function, we get: 
𝐿 =
𝑒𝛼(𝜆𝑦𝑡+𝑓𝑡−𝜋
∗) − 𝛼(𝜆𝑦𝑡 + 𝑓𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) − 1
𝛼2
+ 𝛿(
𝑒𝛾𝑦𝑡 − 𝛾𝑦𝑡 − 1
𝛾2
) +
𝜇
2
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖
∗)2 
𝐿 =
1
𝛼2
[𝑒𝛼(𝜆{−𝜙[𝑖𝑡−𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ]+𝜃𝑆𝑡+𝑔𝑡}+𝑓𝑡−𝜋
∗) − 𝛼(𝜆{−𝜙[𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ] + 𝜃𝑆𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡} + 𝑓𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)
− 1] +
𝛿
𝛾2
(𝑒𝛾{−𝜙[𝑖𝑡−𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ]+𝜃𝑆𝑡+𝑔𝑡} − 𝛾{−𝜙[𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ] + 𝜃𝑆𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡}
− 1) +
𝜇
2
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖
∗)2 
Taking the derivative w.r.t. 𝑖𝑡, we can write the first order condition as: 
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𝜆
𝛼
[−𝜙 − 𝜃
𝐴
(1 + 𝑖𝑡)2
] (𝑒𝛼(𝜆{−𝜙[𝑖𝑡−𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ]+𝜃𝑆𝑡+𝑔𝑡}+𝑓𝑡−𝜋
∗) − 1) + 
𝛿
𝛾
[−𝜙 − 𝜃
𝐴
(1 + 𝑖𝑡)2
] (𝑒𝛾{−𝜙[𝑖𝑡−𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ]+𝜃𝑆𝑡+𝑔𝑡} − 1) +  𝜇(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖
∗) = 0 
Since 𝑠𝑡 =
𝐴
1+𝑖𝑡
: 
𝜆
𝛼
[−𝜙 − 𝜃
𝑠𝑡
1 + 𝑖𝑡
] (𝑒𝛼(𝜆{−𝜙[𝑖𝑡−𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ]+𝜃𝑆𝑡+𝑔𝑡}+𝑓𝑡−𝜋
∗) − 1) + 
𝛿
𝛾
[−𝜙 − 𝜃
𝑠𝑡
1 + 𝑖𝑡
] (𝑒𝛾{−𝜙[𝑖𝑡−𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ]+𝜃𝑆𝑡+𝑔𝑡} − 1) +  𝜇(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖
∗) = 0 
Using (1.5) and (1.6), we can get: 
𝜆
𝛼
[−𝜙 − 𝜃
𝑠𝑡
1 + 𝑖𝑡
] (𝑒𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗) − 1) + 
𝛿
𝛾
[−𝜙 − 𝜃
𝑠𝑡
1 + 𝑖𝑡
] (𝑒𝛾𝑦𝑡 − 1) +  𝜇(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖
∗) = 0 
By rearranging the equation, the first-order condition reads: 
[𝜙 + 𝜃 (
𝑠𝑡
1+𝑖𝑡
)] 𝑍𝑡 = 𝜇(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖
∗)              (1.8) 
Where 𝑍𝑡 = 𝜆
𝑒𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗)−1
𝛼
+ 𝛿
𝑒𝛾𝑦𝑡−1
𝛾
     (1.9) 
 
 
Appendix 2 The derivation of the reduced-form policy function  
Using Taylor series expansion, we can simplify the exponential parts from (1.8), to 
get: 
𝑒𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗) − 1 = 𝛼(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) +
(𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗))2
2
+
(𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗))3
6
+
(𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗))4
2
+ ⋯     (1.81) 
𝑒𝛾𝑦𝑡 − 1 = 𝛾𝑦𝑡 +
(𝛾𝑦𝑡)
2
2
+
(𝛾𝑦𝑡)
6
3
+
(𝛾𝑦𝑡)
24
4
+ ⋯                                                 (1.82) 
Firstly, rewrite (1.8) by using Taylor series products (1.81) and (1.81): 
𝑍𝑡 ≈ 𝜆(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) + 𝜆
𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗)2
2
+ 𝛿𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿
𝛾(𝑦𝑡)
2
2
 (1.83) 
Then, Substitutes 𝑍𝑡 out by using (1.83), we can rewrite equation (1.7) in respect to 𝑖𝑡: 
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𝑖𝑡 =
[𝜙+𝜃(
𝑠𝑡
1+𝑖𝑡
)]
 𝜇
∗ [ 𝜆(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) + 𝜆
𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗)2
2
+ 𝛿𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿
𝛾(𝑦𝑡)
2
2
] + 𝑖∗                (1.71) 
We can split the right hand set of equation (1.71) into the following parts: 
1):  
𝜙
𝜇
* 𝜆(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)+
𝜃
𝜇
*
𝑠𝑡
1+𝑖𝑡
* 𝜆(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) 
2): 
𝜙
𝜇
∗ 𝜆
𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗)2
2
+
𝜃
𝜇
∗
𝑠𝑡
1+𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝜆
𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗)2
2
 
3): 
𝜙
𝜇
∗ 𝛿𝑦𝑡 +
𝜃
𝜇
∗
𝑠𝑡
1+𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝛿𝑦𝑡 
4): 
𝜙
𝜇
∗ 𝛿
𝛾(𝑦𝑡)
2
2
+
𝜃
𝜇
∗
𝑠𝑡
1+𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝛿
𝛾(𝑦𝑡)
2
2
 
Adding those 4 parts together, equation (1.71) becomes: 
𝑖𝑡 =  
𝜙
𝜇
∗  𝜆(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) +
𝜃
𝜇
∗
𝑠𝑡
1+𝑖𝑡
∗  𝜆(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) +
𝜙
𝜇
∗ 𝜆
𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗)2
2
+
𝜃
𝜇
∗
𝑠𝑡
1+𝑖𝑡
∗
𝜆
𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗)2
2
+
𝜙
𝜇
∗ 𝛿𝑦𝑡 +
𝜃
𝜇
∗
𝑠𝑡
1+𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝛿𝑦𝑡 +
𝜙
𝜇
∗ 𝛿
𝛾(𝑦𝑡)
2
2
+
𝜃
𝜇
∗
𝑠𝑡
1+𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝛿
𝛾(𝑦𝑡)
2
2
+ 𝑖∗  
By rearranging the above equation, we can get the central bank response function as 
follows: 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖
∗ + [
 𝜆𝜙
𝜇
+
𝜆𝜃
𝜇
∗
𝑠𝑡
(1 + 𝑖𝑡)
 ] ∗ (𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) + [
𝛼𝜆𝜙
2𝜇
+
𝛼𝜆𝜃
2𝜇
∗
𝑠𝑡
(1 + 𝑖𝑡)
] ∗ (𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)2
+ [
𝜙𝛿
𝜇
+
𝜃𝛿
𝜇
∗
𝑠𝑡
(1 + 𝑖𝑡)
] ∗ 𝑦𝑡 + [
𝛾𝜙𝛿
2𝜇
+
𝛿𝜃𝛾
2𝜇
∗
𝑠𝑡
(1 + 𝑖𝑡)
] ∗ 𝑦𝑡
2    (1.9) 
The equation 1.9 can be reparametrized as follows: 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖
∗ + 𝑑1
, ∗ [𝜙(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) + 𝜃
𝑠𝑡
(1+𝑖𝑡)
(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)] + 𝑑2
, [𝜙(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)2 + 𝜃
𝑠𝑡
(1+𝑖𝑡)
(𝜋𝑡 −
𝜋∗)2] +   𝑑3
, ∗ [𝜙𝑦𝑡 + 𝜃
𝑠𝑡
(1+𝑖𝑡)
𝑦𝑡] + 𝑑4
, ∗ [𝜙𝑦𝑡
2 + 𝜃
𝑠𝑡
(1+𝑖𝑡)
𝑦𝑡
2] + 𝑣𝑡    (2.0) 
Where 𝑑1
, =
𝜆
𝜇
, 𝑑3
, =
𝛿
𝜇
 𝑑2
, =
𝛼𝑑1
,
2
 𝑑4
, =
𝛾𝑑3
,
2
. 
Appendix 3 The derivation of the optimal monetary policy rule   
IS equation: 𝑦𝑡 = −𝜙[𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ] + 𝜃𝑆𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡+1
𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡                           (1.91) 
Phillips equation      𝜋𝑡 = 𝜆𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 + 𝜂𝑡                                        (1.92) 
 
The monetary authority chooses the interest rate that minimizes the loss function L: 
 
𝐿 =
𝑒𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗)−𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗)−1
𝛼2
+ 𝛿(
𝑒𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝛾𝑦𝑡−1
𝛾2
) +
𝜇
2
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖
∗)2                     (1.93) 
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The monetary authority minimizes 𝐿 in (1.93) subject to (1.91), (1.92). In order to 
get the first order condition, we rewrite the equation (1.91), (1.92) as follows: 
 
IS equation: 𝑦𝑡 = −𝜙[𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ] + 𝑔𝑡, where 𝑔𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡+1
𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡           (1.94) 
Phillips equation: 𝜋𝑡 = 𝜆𝑦𝑡 + 𝑓𝑡, where 𝑓𝑡 = 𝛽𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 + 𝜂𝑡                   (1.95) 
 
Then, substituting (1.94) and (1.95) into the loss function, we get: 
 
𝐿 =
𝑒𝛼(𝜆𝑦𝑡+𝑓𝑡−𝜋
∗) − 𝛼(𝜆𝑦𝑡 + 𝑓𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) − 1
𝛼2
+ 𝛿(
𝑒𝛾𝑦𝑡 − 𝛾𝑦𝑡 − 1
𝛾2
) +
𝜇
2
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖
∗)2 
𝐿 =
1
𝛼2
[𝑒𝛼(𝜆{−𝜙[𝑖𝑡−𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ]+𝑔𝑡}+𝑓𝑡−𝜋
∗) − 𝛼(𝜆{−𝜙[𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ] + 𝑔𝑡} + 𝑓𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) − 1]
+
𝛿
𝛾2
(𝑒𝛾{−𝜙[𝑖𝑡−𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ]+𝑔𝑡} − 𝛾{−𝜙[𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ] + 𝑔𝑡} − 1) +
𝜇
2
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖
∗)2 
 
Taking the derivative w.r.t. 𝑖𝑡, we can write the first order condition as: 
 
0 =
−𝜆𝜙
𝛼
[𝑒𝛼(𝜆{−𝜙[𝑖𝑡−𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ]+𝑔𝑡}+𝑓𝑡−𝜋
∗) − 1] +
−𝛿𝜙
𝛾
(𝑒𝛾{−𝜙[𝑖𝑡−𝜋𝑡+1
𝑒 ]+𝑔𝑡} − 1) + 𝜇(𝑖𝑡
− 𝑖∗) 
 
Using (1.94) and (1.95), the first order condition reads: 
 
−𝑑1[𝑒
𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗) − 1] − 𝑑2(𝑒
𝛾𝑦𝑡 − 1) + 𝑑3(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖
∗) = 0 (2.0) 
 
Where 𝑑1 =
𝜆𝜙
𝛼
, 𝑑2 =
𝛿𝜙
𝛾
 and 𝑑3 =  𝜇 
 
Using Taylor series expansion, we can simplify the exponential terms in (2.0), to 
get: 
𝑒𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗) − 1 = 𝛼(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) +
(𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗))2
2
+
(𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗))3
6
+
(𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗))4
2
+ ⋯     (2.01) 
𝑒𝛾𝑦𝑡 − 1 = 𝛾𝑦𝑡 +
(𝛾𝑦𝑡)
2
2
+
(𝛾𝑦𝑡)
6
3
+
(𝛾𝑦𝑡)
24
4
+ ⋯                                                 (2.02) 
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Then, substitutes 𝑒𝛼(𝜋𝑡−𝜋
∗) − 1 and 𝑒𝛾𝑦𝑡 − 1 out using (2.01) and (2.02), we can 
rewrite equation (2.0) in respect to 𝑖𝑡:  
 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) + 𝑐2(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)2 + 𝑐3𝑦𝑡 + 𝑐4(𝑦𝑡)
2 + 𝑢𝑡 (2.1) 
 
Where 𝑐0 is the equilibrium interest rate, 𝑐1 =
𝜆𝜙
𝜇
, 𝑐2 =
𝜆𝜙𝛼
2𝜇
,  𝑐3 =
𝛿𝜙
𝜇
 and 𝑐4 =
𝛿𝜙𝛾
2𝜇
 
 
Appendix 4 Out-of-sample forecasts for the full available sample using the 
same window size as M&P (window size is 120 for all the country) 
Table 2.22: Asymmetric Taylor rule model with no smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.06* 0.51 1.015 0.18 0.52 1.033 
Canada 0.29 0.54 1.054 0.27 0.54 1.057 
Norway 0.03** 0.51 1.015 0.05* 0.51 1.025 
New Zealand 0.07* 0.53 1.036 0.12 0.53 1.049 
Sweden 0.05* 0.52 1.025 0.08* 0.52 1.034 
UK 0.19 0.55 1.046 0.35 0.57 1.067 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.23: Symmetric Taylor rule model with no smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.05* 0.51 1.015 0.14 0.52 1.031 
Canada 0.19 0.53 1.030 0.15 0.52 1.033 
Norway 0.01** 0.50 0.995 0.03** 0.50 1.009 
New Zealand 0.06* 0.53 1.035 0.09* 0.52 1.040 
Sweden 0.05* 0.51 1.013 0.08* 0.52 1.030 
UK 0.02** 0.51 1.010 0.05* 0.53 1.025 
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Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
Table 2.24: Asymmetric Taylor rule model with no smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.06* 0.56 1.148 0.06* 0.54 1.048 
Canada 0.01** 0.58 1.120 0.02** 0.53 1.030 
Norway 0.00*** 0.51 1.021 0.02** 0.52 1.050 
New Zealand 0.00*** 0.54 1.067 0.01** 0.53 1.050 
Sweden 0.56 0.54 1.110   0.60 0.55 1.102 
UK 0.03** 0.56 1.147 0.35 0.56 1.090 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
 
Table 2.25: Symmetric Taylor rule model with smoothing 
 Standard Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Augmented Taylor rule 
fundamentals 
Country CW DMW RMSFE CW DMW RMSFE 
Australia 0.03** 0.52 1.027 0.07* 0.53 1.042 
Canada 0.03** 0.53 1.028 0.03** 0.53 1.028 
Norway 0.02** 0.52 1.029 0.03** 0.51 1.035 
New Zealand 0.01** 0.52 1.029 0.01** 0.53 1.044 
Sweden 0.29 0.54 1.027 0.55 0.55 1.094 
UK 0.13 0.54 1.074 0.21 0.55 1.080 
Note: The Table reports p-values for one-month-ahead forecasts of the following tests: Clark and 
West (2006) (“CW”), Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) (“DMW”). The random walk 
without drift serves as the null model while the standard Taylor rule fundamentals and the augmented 
Taylor rule fundamentals are the alternative models. The script ***, ** and * denote the alternative model 
significantly outperforms the random walk model without drift at the 1%, 5% and 10 % significance 
levels. RMSFE denotes the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the alternative model relative 
to that of the random walk without drift, the values smaller than unity indicate the model forecasts better 
than the random walk without drift. 
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Appendix 5 Data description and summary statistics 
 
 
Table 3.2: Summary statistics of Chapter 1 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
𝑦𝑡 -0.0360 -3.0253 3.5315 1.1540 
𝑖𝑡 3.7382 0.2357 7.1269 2.3454 
𝑠𝑡 8.7492 7.6517 10.3122 0.8535 
𝜋𝑡(1) 2.0665 -0.0200 4.7835 0.9966 
𝜋𝑡(2) 2.7613 -1.4000 5.3000 1.2884 
𝑖𝑡
𝑓
 2.3714 0.2217 4.9596 1.6628 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Data description of Chapter 2 
Symbol Variable Source Description 
𝑦𝑡 Output Gap Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis 
HP cyclical component of the 
seasonally adjusted industrial 
production index 
𝑖𝑡 Nominal interest rate OECD Money market rate 
𝑠𝑡 Nominal exchange rate Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis 
The domestic price (US) of one 
unit foreign currency 
𝑞𝑡 Real exchange rate BIS Log of the real effective exchange 
rate 
𝜋𝑡 CPI inflation rate OECD CPI, percentage changes over 12 
months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Data description of Chapter 1 
Symbol Variable Source Description 
𝑦𝑡 Output Gap ONS: AMBI HP cyclical component of the log 
real GDP 
𝑖𝑡 UK nominal interest rate BoE:IUQAAJ
NB 
3-months Treasury Bills 
𝑠𝑡 Nominal exchange rate BIS Inverse of pounding sterling nominal 
effective exchange rate 
𝜋𝑡(1) UK CPI inflation rate ONS CPI, percentage changes over 12 
months 
𝜋𝑡(2) UK RPI inflation rate ONS RPI, percentage changes over 12 
months 
𝑖𝑡
𝑓
 Foreign nominal interest rate Calculation Weighted average of 3-months 
Treasury Bills of US, Germany and 
Japan 
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics of Chapter 2 
US 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
𝑦𝑡 -0.0497 -5.6172 3.5954 1.2726 
𝑖𝑡 5.1875 0.1100 18.6500 3.9138 
𝜋𝑡 3.8290 -2.0972 14.7565 2.9124 
Australia 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
𝑦𝑡 -0.0243 -4.5803 3.6919 1.1885 
𝑖𝑡 7.9377 1.7000 21.3900 4.5344 
𝑠𝑡 0.8376 0.4998 1.3584 0.1904 
𝑞𝑡 4.4559 4.1304 4.7563 0.1618 
𝜋𝑡 2.9211 -0.2788 9.5890 1.8908 
Canada 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
𝑦𝑡 0.0105 -4.8343 4.8352 1.4948 
𝑖𝑡 5.5164 0.3758 22.0125 4.3126 
𝑠𝑡 0.8042 0.6249 1.0459 0.1020 
𝑞𝑡 4.4776 4.2379 4.6534 0.1118 
𝜋𝑡 2.9396 -0.9499 12.8959 2.4472 
Norway 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
𝑦𝑡 -0.0054 -9.7843 8.2292 3.1140 
𝑖𝑡 6.8047 0.7800 17.1000 4.6699 
𝑠𝑡 0.1465 0.1056 0.1978 0.0200 
𝑞𝑡 4.5498 4.4180 4.6653 0.0496 
𝜋𝑡 3.5359 -1.8315 14.6429 2.8878 
New Zealand 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
𝑦𝑡 -0.6754 -8.7284 9.4420 3.3832 
𝑖𝑡 9.0062 1.8800 27.2000 5.6152 
𝑠𝑡 0.6760 0.3995 1.0736 0.1505 
𝑞𝑡 4.5355 4.2518 4.7821 0.1174 
𝜋𝑡 5.2789 -0.6308 19.3178 5.4670 
Sweden 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
𝑦𝑡 -0.0101 -8.8004 6.7168 2.0160 
𝑖𝑡 5.5725 -0.7900 20.1800 4.7627 
𝑠𝑡 0.1373 0.0926 0.1891 0.0199 
𝑞𝑡 4.7201 4.4821 4.9868 0.1196 
𝜋𝑡 3.0248 -1.8716 13.0804 3.1378 
UK 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
𝑦𝑡 -0.0286 -6.3213 4.9511 1.3009 
𝑖𝑡 6.7193 0.2977 17.9933 4.6335 
𝑠𝑡 1.6750 1.0954 2.4198 0.2418 
𝑞𝑡 4.7711 4.5315 5.0654 0.1050 
𝜋𝑡 5.5854 -1.6000 26.9000 5.2164 
 
